and Smell express both the sensations and the qualities of material
bodies giving rise to them. Thought is the act of thinking ; bat the
same word denotes also the idea resulting from that act. Judgment
is the act of deciding, and also the decision come to. Fixrchase is
the acquisition of a thing by payment, as well as the thing itself so
acquired. Speech is both the act of speaking and the words spoken ;
and so on with regard to an endless multiplicity of words. Mind is
essentially distinct from Matter ; and yet, in all languages, the attributes of the one are metaphorically transferred to those of the
other. Matter, in all its forms, is endowed by the figurative genius
of every language with the functions which pertain to intellect; and
we perpetually talk of its phenomena and of its powers, as if they
resulted from the voluntary influence of one body on another, acting
and reacting, impelling and being impelled, controlling and being
controlled, as if animated by spontaneous energies and guided by
specific intentions. On the other hand, expressions, of which the
primary signification refers exclusively to the properties and actions
of matter, are metaphorically applied to the phenomena of thought
and volition, and even to the feelings and passions of the soul ; and
in speaking of a ray of hope, a shade of doubt, b, flight of fancy, a
flash of wit, the warmth of emotion, or the ebullitions of anger, we are
scarcely conscious that we are employing metaphors which have this
material origin.
As a general rule, I have deemed it incumbent on me to place words and phrases which appertain more especially to one head, also under the other heads to which they have a relation, whenever it appeared to me that this repetition would suit the convenience of the inquirer, and spare him the trouble of turning to other parts of the work ; for I have always jareferred to subject myself to the imputation of redundance, rather than incur the reproach of insufficiency.[1] When, however, the divergence of the associated from the primary idea is sufficiently marked, I have contented myself with
- ↑ Frequent repetitions of the same series of expressions, accordingly, will be met with under various headings. For example, the word Eelinqmshmeiit, with its synonyms, occurs as a heading at No. 624, where it applies to intention, and also at No. 782, where it refers to propeHy. The word Chance has two significations, distinct from one another : the one implying the absence of an asdgnahle cavse ; in which case it comes under the category of the relation of Causation, and occupies the No. 156: the other, the absence of design, in which latter sense it ranks under the operations of the Will, and has assigned to it the place No. 621. I have, in like manner, distinguished Sensihility, Pleasure, Pain, Taste, &c., according as they relate to Physical, or to Moral Affections', the former being found at Nos. 375, 377, 378, 390, &c., and the latter at Nos. 822, 827, 828, 850, &c.
