Per Curiam
because it excludes from the definition of “covered company” any company that operates an application “whose primary purpose is to allow users to post product reviews, business reviews, or travel information and reviews.” §2(g)(2)(B); see Brief for Petitioners in No. 24–656, pp. 26–27 (Brief for TikTok); Brief for Petitioners in No. 24–657, p. 26 (Brief for Creator Petitioners). We need not decide whether that exclusion is content based. The question before the Court is whether the Act violates the First Amendment as applied to petitioners. To answer that question, we look to the provisions of the Act that give rise to the effective TikTok ban that petitioners argue burdens their First Amendment rights. The exclusion for certain review platforms, however, applies only to the general framework for designating applications controlled by “covered compan[ies],” not to the TikTok-specific designation. §§2(g)(3)(A)–(B). As such, the exclusion is not within the scope of petitioners’ as-applied challenge.
b
The Government also supports the challenged provisions with a content-neutral justification: preventing China from collecting vast amounts of sensitive data from 170 million U. S. TikTok users. 2 App. 628. That rationale is decidedly content agnostic. It neither references the content of speech on TikTok nor reflects disagreement with the message such speech conveys. Cf. Ward, 491 U. S., at 792–793 (holding noise control and sound quality justifications behind city sound amplification guideline were content neutral).
Because the data collection justification reflects a “purpos[e] unrelated to the content of expression,” it is content neutral. Id., at 791.
2
The Act’s TikTok-specific distinctions, moreover, do not trigger strict scrutiny. See Brief for TikTok 26–27; Brief for
