Page:Toll Roads and Free Roads.pdf/162

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116
TOLL ROADS AND FREE ROADS

might have been acquired at a relatively moderate cost. The owners then may be presumed to have been eager for the improvement of the road for their own use; and the land at that time being served by an inadequate highway facility stood at a lower level of value. But, at the time, even this moderate cost appeared too great; and such inevitable delays as might have been encountered appeared too long, for the time of improvement was at hand, the demand of the public was insistent, and the appropriated funds awaited expenditure in the treasury.

When further widening is thus forced the needed additional land has risen in value. There are more owners or occupants to deal with and many of the new ones occupy the very margins of the road where they conduct various sorts of traffic-serving business. To some of the owners the additional widening, required mainly for the accommodation of an increased volume of passing traffic, is of little interest and in their view will confer no new or greatly desired benefits. To others, the widening proposed means the destruction of their property. So the owners ask a higher price.

Forced to act, the highway authorities decide to acquire an additional strip of land. As they must buy the front of the properties affected, a price well above the average acreage value of the neighboring lands is demanded. And, because of the higher price and a continuing competing demand of other needed improvements far exceeding in cost all the funds of which they are assured, they decide to acquire only the narrowest strip that will physically accommodate the widening to be made immediately. If they should attempt to pursue the more farsighted policy of acquiring sufficient width to provide not only for the immediately projected improvement but also for probable future widening, such excess acquisition, if resisted by the landowners, could be accomplished only by exercise of the power of eminent domain. In the latter case, the general attitude of the courts that private property taken under the power of eminent domain may not exceed that needed for public use would have an important bearing, as many instances are of record where attempted takings by condemnation in excess of that actually necessary for the physical location and construction of definitely contemplated improvements have been held unconstitutional by the courts. This obstacle, however, is not encountered in cases of excess taking that are accomplished by agreement with the landowners without resort to the power of eminent domain.

Two other major situations frequently arise further to complicatethe right-of-way problem, particularly when it is found desirable to establish a new highway alinement by cutting across existing property lines. Such instances usually encounter not only a strong resistance to the change by those who may be inconvenienced thereby, but also generally involve, (1) the problem of remnants, i.e., small parcels that are separated by the road improvement from the main body of land to which they were originally attached, and the value of which to the owner is alleged to be destroyed or definitely impaired; and (2) the question of denial of access from adjacent lands to so-called freeways, i. e., highways to which access is permitted only at certain selected points as a measure for dealing with heavy streams of extra-local traffic.