racters, or at least which we cannot see to do so. We have at least the authority of Bishop Butler to support us in considering that,
"we are wholly ignorant what degree of new knowledge it were to be expected God would give mankind by Revelation, upon supposition of His affording one; or how far, or in what way, he would interpose miraculously, to qualify them to whom He should originally make the Revelation, for communicating the knowledge given by it; and to secure their doing it to the age in which they should live, and to secure its being transmitted to posterity[1]."
But even though Butler, and other deep thinkers, had not said a word on the subject, the immediate and inevitable result, or rather operation of Mr. Erskine's principle, when applied to the matter of the Scripture Revelation, is a sufficient refutation of it. It will be found to mean nothing, or to lead pretty nearly to Socinianism. Let us take an instance: he says that the reasonableness of a religion, and therefore its claim on our acceptance, consists in there being a direct and natural tendency in belief in its doctrines to form that moral character which it recommends. Now, I would ask,—do we never hear it asked,—have we never been tempted to ask ourselves,—"What is the harm of being e.g., a Sabellian?" And is not the habit of thought, from which such questionings proceed, owing to the silent influence of such books as this of Mr. E.'s? Further, do we not hear persons say, "As to the Athanasian doctrine, I do not deny there is a Mystery about the Manifestations of the Divine Nature in Scripture, but this Mystery, whatever it is, as it does not interfere with the practical view of the doctrine, so, on the other, it cannot subserve it. It is among the secret things of God, and must be left among them;"—as if we might unthankfully throw back again into the infinite abyss, any of the jewels which God has vouchsafed to bring us thence.
The reader may at first sight be tempted to say, "This is an overstrained handling of Mr. Erskine's words. What he does mean, is, not that the want of connexion between doctrine and precept is an objection, (though his words strictly taken may say this,) but, that where such a connexion does exist, as we see it does in Christianity, there is a strong argument in behalf of the
- ↑ Anal. ii. 3.
