sidered as equivalent with regard to our mental qualities: 'any quality of the mind is virtuous which causes love or pride,' 575; the same qualities always produce pride and love, humility and hatred, owing to sympathy, 589.
C. The vice and virtue of, 592 f.; they are called virtuous or vicious according as they are agreeable or disagreeable to others without any reflections on their tendency, 592; this due to sympathy and comparison, 593; sympathy causes pride to have in some measure the same effect as merit, but comparison causes us to hate it, and pride appears vicious to us, especially if we are ourselves proud, 596; pride advantageous to the possessor as increasing his power, and also agreeable, 597 (cf. 295, 391, 600); humility only required in externals, 598; heroic virtue is steady and well-established pride and self-esteem, 599 (v. Moral, § 2. A, 3. D; Sympathy, § 2, 3).
Primary and secondary qualities, 226-231 (v. Body).
Private—and public duties, 546; the proportions of private and national morality settled by the practice of the world, 569.
Probability (v. Cause, § 8)—and possibility, 133, 135; used in two senses: (1) including all evidence except knowledge, and so including arguments from cause and effect; (2) confined to uncertain arguments from conjecture, and distinguished both from knowledge and proof or arguments from cause and effect, 124; probable reasoning nothing but a species of sensation, 103; two kinds of, viz. uncertainty in the object itself or in the judgment, 444; general rules create a species of, which sometimes influences the judgment and always the imagination, 585; all knowledge degenerates into probability by consideration of the fallibility of our faculties, 180; but ever this estimate of our faculties is only probable, and this new probability diminishes the force of the former, and so a third probability will arise, and so on, ad infinitum, till at last we have a total extinction of belief and evidence, 182; a certain amount of probability is however always retained owing to the small influence which subtle doubt have on our imagination, so that our belief is really only affected by the first doubts, 185; the only remedy for scepticism is carelessness and inattention, 218 (v. Scepticism); explains distinction between power (q.v.) and its exercise, 313; probable reasoning influences direction of our passions, 414; influence of on our passions, 444 f.
Promises—The convention which establishes justice not a promise. 490; none in a state of nature, 501; obligation of, 516 f.; the rule which enjoins performance of, not natural because (1) a promise unintelligible before human conventions, (2) even if intelligible would not be obligatory, 516; the act of mind expressed by a, not a resolution or desire to perform anything, nor the willing the action, 516, nor the willing the obligation, 511, 518, 513, 524: we have no motive leading to their performance distinct from a
