Page:Tyler v. Hennepin County.pdf/18

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Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023)
1

Gorsuch, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 22–166


GERALDINE TYLER, PETITIONER v. HENNEPIN COUNTY, MINNESOTA, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[May 25, 2023]

Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Jackson joins, concurring.

The Court reverses the Eighth Circuit’s dismissal of Geraldine Tyler’s suit and holds that she has plausibly alleged a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. I agree. Given its Takings Clause holding, the Court understandably declines to pass on the question whether the Eighth Circuit committed a further error when it dismissed Ms. Tyler’s claim under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. Ante, at 14. But even a cursory review of the District Court’s excessive-fines analysis—which the Eighth Circuit adopted as “well-reasoned,” 26 F. 4th 789, 794 (2022)—reveals that it too contains mistakes future lower courts should not be quick to emulate.

First, the District Court concluded that the Minnesota tax-forfeiture scheme is not punitive because “its primary purpose” is “remedial”—aimed, in other words, at “compensat[ing] the government for lost revenues due to the nonpayment of taxes.” 505 F. Supp. 3d 879, 896 (Minn. 2020). That primary-purpose test finds no support in our law. Because “sanctions frequently serve more than one purpose,” this Court has said that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to any statutory scheme that “serv[es] in part to punish.” Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602, 610 (1993) (emphasis added). It matters not whether the scheme has a remedial