investigations over past transactions, believing it well to impress officers of the government with the fact that they will not escape from their responsibility when they leave their offices, and contractors that neither their plunder nor their persons will be safe, although their accounts may have been closed and the money gone into their pockets. Such a lesson, taught in the most incisive manner, will not fail to have a wholesome effect, and, indeed, it is a most necessary one with regard to the Indian service, whose extensive ramifications render a minute supervision extremely difficult. There is no doubt that fraud in the performance of contracts and dishonest practices in the delivery and distribution of supplies and annuity goods have frequently been the cause of just discontent among the Indians, sometimes resulting in trouble and disaster.
I do not deem the present machinery of the Indian service sufficient for the prevention or discovery of abuses and fraudulent practices. The inspectors and superintendents, who are charged, among other things, with such duty, have in but rare instances been successful in ferreting out the wily expedients resorted to by dishonest contractors or agents. The records of the Indian Office bear out this assertion. When a superintendent or an inspeetor visits an agency, his coming is almost always known beforehand, so that there is time enough to conceal evidences of fraud and mismanagement. It is very like “catching birds with a brass band.” What the Indian Bureau needs, perhaps more than any other branch of the government, is a special service, composed of efficient agents, who, under the immediate control of the department, can move secretly, and can pounce upon the point to be investigated without premonition. I venture to express the hope that Congress will not refuse the appropriation asked for to serve this purpose. A proper use made of such an appropriation will not only improve the character of the service, but also be an efficient measure of economy.
I desire to add that the investigations carried on by this department for the discovery and correction of fraudulent practices are, in many respects, seriously hampered by its want of power to compel the attendance and pay the fees of witnesses and to punish for contempt. We may, therefore, frequently fail in our inquiries, not because the will but because the means are lacking. Congress can exercise that power to its fullest extent, and Congressional investigations may, therefore, become very desirable when the department, for the reasons stated, finds itself unable to go to the bottom of suspected transactions—unless Congress sees fit to invest the department with such authority as is required to accomplish the object, by amending sections 183 and 184, Revised Statutes, so as to enlarge the powers of the Secretary of the Interior in this respect.
