1788.
nia; and 2d, That it extended to the case of a Summons, as well as a Capias.
I. He said, that where there was the fame reason, there ought to be the fame law; and if the purpose of privilege was to prevent a man's being drawn aside from his public duty; or embarrassed with private cares, during his attendance upon it, that fundamental principle operated, at least, with as much force in Pennsylvania as in England; and in the case of the State Convention (whose business was of the most critical nature) perhaps, more than in the case of any permanent deliberative Assembly. But, he asked, what writer has ever treated privilege as the result of a form of Government, composed of three branches? Experience contradicts the assertion. Even in England, a member of Parliament cannot plead his privilege against a debt due to the Crown, so superior is prerogative; the privilege which the law of nations confers upon Ambassadors, is not the result of any particular form of Government; nor does the privilege recognized in Courts of Justice, rest upon so equivocal a basis. Is a suitor here protected from arrests upon any political consideration? or, can it be said that a witness at this bar, owes his security to the textural of the constitution? No: These are the effects of an universal principle, which equally applies in all Countries, and under every modification of Government; for, when the business of the State requires the attendance of an individual at a particular place, it would be unreasonable and unjust to expose him to an inconveniency, which he would not have suffered, but for that attendance;—it would be impolitic, likewise; for few men would be willing, on such terms, to engage in the public service.
2. The preceding argument must serve, likewise, to shew, that the privilege extends to the case of a Summons, as well as a Capias, For, though the Defendant avoids the trouble of entering special bail; yet the former process, as well as the latter, will oblige him to attend the Court from which it issues, however remote it may be from his fixed place of residence. But, in the present case, the Defendant is not solicitous to be discharged from the suit, for he will engage to appear gratis in the proper county.
The difficulty, in fact, arises from the nature and extend of the jurisdictions of our Courts. In England the jurisdiction of the King's Bench and Common Pleas being co-executive with the kingdom, those Courts can direct the venue to be laid in the County where the cause of action originated. But here, our County Courts are in their nature circumscribed; and it has lately been determined in the Supreme Court, on a motion by Mr. Sergeant to change the venue from Bucks to Philadelphia, that, even there, this relief could not be claimed; for the act of 1766,[1] expressly declares, that the venue shall be laid in the county where the action is instituted. The Defendant's claim, therefore, is rather the privilege of being sued in a particular Court, than an exemption either from arrest, or being impleaded, and we fay that he ought not to be sued in thisCourt,
- ↑ See 1 State Laws 114. and 338.
