1788.
join in the infliction of puniſhment. 1 Vat. 98. ſect. 232. We cannot, therefore, make ourſelves parties to the public ſeverities of Connecticut, nor interfere in the relation and conflict, between that State and its Subjects: And, as no public proceedings have taken place againſt the Plaintiff here, there is no any authority for denominating him an offender againſt Pennſylvania. The only inſtance in which theſe general principles have ſuſtained an alteration by the articles of Confederation, is confined to the perſons of offenders; and expreſſlio unius eſt excluſio alterius.
But the admiſſion of this plea would be attended with conſequences ſo inconvenient, that the more argument ab inconvenio ought to prevent it. In whatever ſhape it is claimed, it would interfere with the axiom, that one nation cannot intermedle with the government of another. Vall. p. 138. ſect. 54. If the Plaintiff was attainted, or in debt, here, his property could not be forfeited or attached, ſince, by the adverſe argument, it belongs to Connecticut: Nay, if he came hither with a view to ſettle, he could not act, trade, or become a uſeful Citizen on the funds he found here. Thus a coliiſio legum would ariſe; the univerſal rule, of which, is, that the laws and the intereſt of the State have juriſdiction of the cauſe, ſhall be preferred. 2 Hub. 26. 3 axiom.
2. To the ſecond objection he anſwered, that it was not founded in the truth of the caſe. Names ought not to be miſlead us; for although his property in Connecticut had been confiſcated, and an adminiſtrator appointed to collect it; yet nothing appears to prove that the Plaintiff is not ſtill alive to every legal purpoſe there, as well as here; independent too of the Treaty of Peace.
3. But, in anſwer to the third objection, he inſiſted, that the Treaty of Peace removes not only the perſonal diſability, if any ſuch there was, but alſo the particular Bar. Whether, indeed, it operates as a general reverſal, or a general pardon, may be queſtionable; although the former in the more probable conjecture, ſince the proviſion made in favor of recovering property fold as confiſcated, would have been needleſs if it was only conſidered in the light of a pardon. But, admitting it to be only a pardon, and that it has no effect againſt bona fide purchaſers, he contended, that it was concluſively in favour of the Plaintiff on the point of reſtitution, as againſt the State; and, a fortiori, in a cafe where his credits had not been reduced into poſſeſſion. The fair conſtruction of the Treaty neceſſarily warrants this doctrine.
Ingerſol, in reply,–There are a variety of inſtances in which this queſtion will be agitated, if the Plaintiff ſhould now prevail; and the purſes of individuals, as well as the coffers of the State, will be deeply affected by the deciſion. It muſt be remarked that neither the Defendant, nor Connecticut, aſk the interpoſition of this Court, but the perſon who was the object of the law of that State; that the Defendant does not intercept the money in its courſe to the public Treaſury; but prevents its being remitted to Nova-Scotia; and that the conteſt, in fact, lies between an individual and a ſiſter State.
He
