1788.
In conſequence of this recommendation, the State of Connecticut, in the month of May, 1778, paſſed an act to confiſcate the eſtates of perſons inimical to the independence and liberties of the United States, within that State. By this law, all eſtates, real and perſonal, within the State, which belonged to any perſon, on perſons, who had gone over and joined with the enemies of the United States, or had aided or aſſiſted them, or ſhould thereafter do ſo, were declared to be confiſcated. The mode of proceeding againſt thoſe who had been inhabitants, was directed to be by application to the County Court, who are empowered to give judgment and ſentence, that all the eſtate of ſuch perſons ſhould be forfeited for the uſe of State. The Court is then directed to grant adminiſtration of the eſtates, as in caſe of interſtates eſtates.–The adminiſtrators were to ſell ſuch eſtates, inſtitute ſuits, recover and pay debts, and deliver over the ſurplus, if any, into the Treaſury of the State. The laſt clauſe in the act directs the mode of proceeding as to the eſtates of perſons who never had an abode within the State.
In purſuance of this act, Abiatbar Camp, (who is ſtated to have been lately a reſident of the town of Newhaven,) in the month of September 1779, was charged on the information of the ſelect men, before the County Court, with having joined the enemies of the United States, and put himſelf under the protection of the King of Great Britain: He was thereupon adjudged guilty, and ſentence paſſed, that all his eſtate real and perſonal ſhould be forfeited to the uſe of the State. Certain parts of Camp’s eſtate were in conſequence of this forfeiture ſeized and ſold; but no proceeding was had to recover againſt James Lockwood, the preſent Defendant, the debt ſaid to be due from him to the Plaintiff, although the Defendant was at that time, and for ſome time afterwards, an inhabitant of Connecticut, and amenable for the ſame.
And here the queſtion ariſes, whether the Plaintiff himſelf can now recover it?
It is contended, on the part of the Plaintiff, that the proceeding againſt him was as an enemy, and not as a traitor, and that, therefore, the war being over, his right revives. The ſentence againſt him was certainly not expreſsly for treaſon, and there is no judgment againſt him that, in terms, ſubjects his perſon to puniſhment as a traitor. The act of Aſſembly directs the proceeding to be had only againſt the eſtates of ſuch perſons as had joined the enemy, but it diſtinguiſhes between ſch as had been inhabitants of that State, and thoſe who never had an abode within it, but had eſtates there. The preſent Plaintiff was convicted as an offender of the former deſcription, being late a reſident in the town of Newhaven, and is plainly pointed out as a ſubject. Indeed, the fact is conceeded, that he really was a citizen of the State, who joined the enemy long after the declaration of independence and the organization of our State Governments. He cannot, therefore, be conſidered in the light of ſuch a public enemy whoſe rights are ſaid by the writers on the law of nations, to revive after the termination of
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