1789.
wards, as to these which were previously, emitted by Congress:—A matter that we are not bound, nor are we inclined to countenance.
This opinion, unanimously formed, upon mutual consultation, and full deliberation, leads to a more particular consideration of the evidence; and, if the Jury think that the bills of credit, or any part of them, which were tendered to the Plaintiff on the 29th of March, 1780, were emitted subsequent to the 29th of January, 1777, they must only give this tender the effect at common law.
It may be proper here to notice, that these were two bills of thirty dollars each, in the bundle of paper money tendered; and the Plaintiff's counsel has said, that there no bills of that denomination emitted prior to the 29th of January 1777. But he is certainly mistaken; as I remember well the trial of a man for counterfeiting a thirty dollar bill emitted in 1776; and, therefore, this circumstance is by no means conclusive.
But should the Jury, upon the whole of the evidence, find, that this tender was made in bills of credit emitted since the 29th of January, 1777, and so not an absolute discharge of the debt, they will next enquire, in what manner the bond ought not to be paid? By the act of the 3d of April, 1781, it is declared, that all debts and contracts entered into between the 1st of January, 1777, and the 1st of March, 1781, shall be liquidated according to the scale of depreciation. The Plaintiff, therefore, is not entitled to recover the whole £500. in specie, but only so much as that sum in paper money was worth at the time the contract was entered into; which was on the 24th of April, 1777: Nor is he entitled to any interest from the date of the tender until this action (which is to be considered as a new demand) was instituted.
The Jury found a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff for £272. 3. 4. debt with costs: from which, it seems, that they were of opinion, that the tender was not made entirely in bills of credit emitted before the 29th of January, 1777; and that they pursued the directions of the Court in that alternative.
Steele versus Steele.
THIS was an issue joined on the facts alledged in a libel for a divorce; and, upon the trial, the Chief Justice observed, that notice ought to be given of the facts intended to be proved under the general allegations of the libel.
Rush,Justice; I think it would be most convenient to give notice, that between two specific dates, acts of cruelty &c. were intended to be proved.
The Court seemed to adopt that idea, and recommended it, for the future practice of the bar.
