1784.
cited 15 Vin. Abr. 127. pl. 3. 5. 6. 8. Cro. Eliz. 675. 5 Rep. 47. 6. 48. a. 1. Vern. 318. 3 Black. Comm. 316. See 10 Vin. Abr. 498. pl. 9.
Hunter’s
to the law merchant, and anſwerable in the ſtate where it happens to be imported.
That ſovereignty is better repreſented by perſons than things: and as any or all the citizens of Virginia would be amenable to the juriſdiction of this ſtate, if they were to come within its bounds, ſo there is no reaſon why property brought here ſhould not be attached as well as the citizen arreſted.
That one ſovereign may lay duties upon the goods of another; and this appears to have been the ſenſe of Congreſs, by their expreſsly ſtipulating in the articles of confederation, that no duties ſhould be laid by one ſtate, on the property of another.
That the goods, which were attached, were certainly liable for their freight: ſo if they had been imported contrary to law, they were ſubject to forfeiture: proceſs againſt them might iſſue out of this court, and juriſdiction over them be exerciſed, the ſovereignty of Virginia not withſtanding.
That if a veſſel belonging to Virginia, ſhould be taken, as prize retaken, and libelled here, Virginia muſt ſubmit her claim to the deciſion of the admiralty of Pennſylvania, and could not claim an exemption, on account of her ſovereignty.
That a ſovereign ſtate may wave its right–and by the very act of importing merchandise, it ſubjects itſelf to the juriſdiction of the country.
That all property in this ſtate is under the protection of the government, and therefore ſhould be anſwerable is its turn, and amendable to its laws.
That the ſtatute of Ann, though declaratory, is only declaratory of the ideas which that parliament entertained of the laws of nations. Theſe were often erroneous, and could not be binding on us.
That whatever might be the caſe with regard to foreign miniſters, by the articles of confederation, the delegates from Virginia were privileged only in their perſons, and not in their goods: and as they repreſent the ſtate, it was to be preſumed, they enjoy every exemption that their ſovereign expected or claimed.
They ſaid, that whether Virginia was ſubject to, or exempt from, the juriſdiction of this ſtate, in the preſent inſtance, was not the point now in queſtion: it was only, whether the ſheriff ſhould or ſhould not obey the command of the court.
That by the writ, he was directed to return it to the court, and he was not to withhold the proceſs in contempt of this order, and to ſtifle the proceedings in their birth.
That the ſheriff was to act under the judgment of the court, and if he had any doubt about the validity of the writ, he ought to return it. Then the court might, if cauſe was ſhewn, quaſh it as illegal.
That his not being obliged to return proceſs againſt ambaſſadors was owing to the ſtatute of Ann: and this exemption was ſingular, and not to be extended here.
That though a writ might be void, where the court had no juridiction of the cauſe, or iſſued a writ, which they had no authority to iſſue; yet the cauſe here was treſpaſs upon the caſe, of which the court may hold plea, and the proceſs was a foreign attachment, which they certainly had authority to iſſue.
That to ſuffer the ſheriff to ſuppreſs writs at pleaſure, was eſtabliſhing a dangerous precedent, which in future would be greatly abuſed.
That the queſtions upon which this caſe depended, were important, and deſerved the fullest conſideration: and that an appeal from one tribunal to another, was the right and the ſecurity of the ſubject. But if the writ was now to be ſuppreſſed, there could be no record to be removed, and the plaintiff was left without remedy.
They finally obſerved, that this mode of applying to a court of judicature, to decide on the juſtice of the plaintiff’s demand, was every way preferable to that propoſed by the attorney general, of ſending him to complain to the executive power, who could give him no redreſs, but by appealing to arms, and involving this ſtate in a war.
They therefore prayed that the rule might be made abſolute.
The Court held the matter ſome days under adviſement—and at their next meeting, the President delivered it as the judgment of the court.
“That the rule made upon the ſheriff, to return the writ iſſued againſt the commonwealth of Virginia, at the ſuit of Simon Nathan, fhould be diſcharged.”
