1784.
Leib verſus Bolton.
A motion was made, the 10th of November, on the part of the defendant, to ſet aſide the return of the jury of inquiry, on affidavit of irregular proceedings; and the Court granted a rule to ſhew cauſe &c.
And now two of the jurors attended and depoſed, that Leib’s book, ſupported by his own oath, had been admitted as evidence of the delivery of a quantity of leather by Leib, to the order of Bolton, in part diſcharge of an agreement between them. But being aſked, whether they founded their inqueſt in any degree upon that evidence, they ſaid it was founded upon that, and concurrent teſtimony.
In ſupport of the motion it was contended, that, though the admiſſion of books in the manner above ſtated, had been cuſtomary; yet that the cuſtom ought not to be carried farther than to prove work done, or wares delivered; that the purpoſe for which they had been introduced, on the preſent occaſion, aroſe upon a collateral point, to eſtabliſh a ſett off in diminution of the damages, and that it was, therefore, irregular to admit them. With reſpect to the concurrent teſtimony mentioned by the jurors, it was ſaid, that as neither the nature, or effect of it, appeared to the Court, it might have been even more improper than the allowance of the books as evidence; but that, in all events, the inqueſt ought to be ſet aſide, as what did appear, ſhews it to have been raiſed ſo far upon an erroneous foundation.
But, by the Court: We will not ſet aſide the verdicts of juries of inquiry; nor the reports of referrees, upon frivolous grounds. Nor will we examine into the effect of any particular piece of evidence upon the minds of the jury; for, unleſs, it appears, that there was no proper evidence before them, we muſt preſume that they had ſufficient grounds for their inqueſt.
The Rule diſcharged.
Hagner
