OCTOBER TERM, 1907. Opinion of the (?ourt. 909 U. 8. But it is said this construction of the act is in violation of the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United .States, which requires crimes to be prosecuted and punished in the State or district where the same are committed, and that as the transportation was had, at least, in part in K?naa% the offense was there completed and could not be prosecuted else- where. But the constitutional provision does not require the prosecution of the defendant in the district wherein he may reside at the time of the commission of the offense, or where he may happen to be at that time, provided he is prosecuted where the offense is committed. The constitutional require- meat is as to the locality of the offense and not the personal presence of the offender. In re Pall?er, 136 U..S. 257, 265; Burton v. United Stat?, 202 U.S. 344, 387. This doctrine finds illustration in Palliser's case, supra, in which a person was prosecuted in Connecticut for mailing a letter in New York, addressed to the postmaster in the former State, to induce him to violate his official duty, and it wa? therein argued that the offense was complete in New York when the letter was mailed, and that 9nly in the New York district could the prosecution be constitutionally had; but this court, speaking through Mr. 'Justice Gray, said: "There can be no doubt at all, if any offense was committed in New York, the offense was continuing to be committed when the letter reached the postmaster in Connecticut." In that case the offender had done no act ?ut of New York and the acta performed by him were complete when the letter was delivered at the post orifice in that State, but this court held the crime to be a continuing one. We think the doctrine f6r stronger reason applies in the present case, for transporta- tion is an essential element of the offense, and, as we have said, transportation equally takes place over any and all of the traveled route, and during transportation the crime is being constantly committed. It does not follow from this view of the character of the offense that a single transporta- tion of goods can be made the basis of repeated separate
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