ARMOUR PACKING CO. ?. UNITED STATES. 8? ?9 U.S. Opinion of t? Cour? rates would have been realized by the Chesapeake and Ohio from the contract, which is not the case, it ?s apparent that the deliveries under the contract came under the prohibition of the statute whenever for any cause, such as the enhanced cost of coal at the mines, an increase in the cost of the ocean cartage, etc. , the gross sum realized was not sufficient to net the Chesapeake and Ohio. it? published tariff of rates. This must be the case in order to give vitality to the prohibitions of the interstate commerce act against the acceptance at any time by a carrier of less than it? published rates. We say this because we think it obvious that such prohibitions would be rendered wholly ineffective by deciding that a carrier may' avoid those prohibitions by making a contract for the sale of a commodity stipulating for the payment of a fixed pries in the future and thereby acquiring the power during the life of the contract to continue to execute it, although a violation of the act to regulate commerce might arise from doing so." It is alleged that the indictment is insufficient, in that it fails to set out the Mnd of device by which traffic was obtained, and of what the concession consisted, and how ig was granted. Authorities are cited to the proposition that in statutory offenses every element must be distinctly charged and alleged. This court has frequently had occasion to hold that the accused is entitled to know the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and that a charge must be sufficiently definite to enable him to make his defense and avail himself of the record of conviction or acquittal for his protection against further prosecutions and to inform the court of the facts charged, so that it may decide as to their sufficiency in law to support a ?onviction, if one be had, and the elements of the offense must be set forth in the indictment with reasonable particularity of timel place and circumstances. And it is true it is not always sufficient to charge statutory offenses in the language of the statutes, and where the offense includes generic terms it is not sufficient that the indictment charge the offense in the same generic terms, but it must state the particulars.
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