?9 U. & Opiaton of tha ?ourt. facts being stated, the indictment is clearly sufficient. Whether it was necessary to charge actual knowledge of the change of rats on the shipper's part is a question not involved in ?this case, as the indictment charges such knowledge, and the facts stipu- lated show that the shipvet knew of the establishing of the new rate when ?he goods descnoed in the indictment were shipped. It is again contended that the submission in the trial court tion of the act and to obtain the transportation at the less rate, was prejudicial to the petitioners, as such issue was not within the agreed facts upon which the ca?e wa? tried. It is true, as we have held in another part of this opinion, that no device or contrivance, secret or fraudulent in its nature, is requisits to the commission of the offense outlined in the statuts, and that any means by which transportation by a con- ce?on from the established rate was had is sufficient to work a conviction. Hence this charge was not prejudicial to the peti- tioner. It is contended by the petitioner that there is nothing in the facts found in this case to show any intsntionai violation of the law; that on the contrary the'petitioner belicre? itself to be within its legal rights-in insisting upon the performance of its contract, and maintained in good faith that the Interstate Commerce Act did not and could not interfere with it, and that the statuts had no application to a shipment of goods for ex- portation in the manner shown ifi this case. While intent is in a certain sense essential to the commission of a crime, and in some classes of cases it is necessary to show moral turpitude in order to make otlt a crime, there is a class of cases within which we think the one under consideration falls, where pur- posely doing a thing prohibited by statute may amount to an offense, although the act does not involve turpitude or moral wrong.. In this case the statutes provide it shall be penal to receive 'transportation of goods at less than the published rate. Whether shippers who pay a rate under the honest belief that it is the lawfully established rats, when in fact it is not, are
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