270 OCTOBER TERM, 1907. such, signed it by making her mark. She was a woman of good sense, particular about her busine? transactions, and manifested her usual soundness of mind at the time. It is not shown that she was laboring under any feebleness of mind from disease, or approaching dissolution. The provisions of her will appear to be reasonable. It is not shown that any imposition was practiced upon her, or that her sous had any agency in the preparation of the will. It was erroneous for the court to tell the jury as a matter of law that it being shown that she could not read, it was necessary to prove that the will was read to her. They had the right to infer, from all of the circumstances, that she knew the contents of the will, though, as shown by the authorities above quoted, in deter- mining whether there .was fraud or imposition in the execution of the will, the fact that she could not read, and that the will was not read to her, at the time she signed it, were circum- stances to be considered by the jury." True, the presumption that a party signing a will by mark, or otherwise, knows its contents, is not a conclu?ve presump- tion, but it must prevail in the absence of proof of fraud, un- due influence, or want of testamentary capacity attending the. execution of the will. In the present case there was no ?t- tempt to show that the testatrix was not capable of making a valid deed or contract at the date of making the will; on the contrary, the evidence showed that she was a woman of energy, capacity and intelligence. Nor was any proof offered of fraud or undue influence in the production of the will. Mrs. Lipp- hard brought the will, as we have said, to Miss Parker's office for the purpose of having it executed; she declared to the at- testing witnesses the paper to which she made her mark to be her last will and testament. She was a person of sound mind at the date of the will, and it was executed and attested in the manner required by statute. It is obvious that the verdict of the jury ought not to be disturbed and a new trial allowed, unless some reversible error was committed in the course of the trial, and appellants insist
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