316 OCTOBER TERM? 1?07. Oph?on of the Court. ?09 U. 8. titled to its pro rata share, while if executed subsequently the full amount of its claim, regardless of the claims of the other creditors, would be the amount due. In other words, these provisions, contained in the single section of the act, are to be considered as prospective only and as applicable to bonds executed subsequently to the peruage of the amendment. There is another most important amendment, by which the material-man's right to sue is suspended until after the com- pletion of the work and final settlement and for six months thereafter, during which the United States can alone sue upon the bond. Instead of a r/ght to sue at once upon the non- payment of his ds/m, he is precluded from doing so, perhaps for years. Although the time in which to commence action may be shortened and made applicable to ?auses of action already accrued, provided a reasonable tim? is left in which such ac- tions may be commenced (Terr?j v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628; W/Son v. Isemi?jer, 185 U.S. 55), yet that is a different prin- ciple from taking away absolutely a present right to sue until a period of time, measured possibly by years, shall have elapsed. These various provisions are all contained in the same sec- tion of the statute, and there is not much of it left to be made retrospective, as matter of procedure, after these other pro- visions have been held to be prospective only. If the liraita- t/on as to the district in which the suit upon the bond could be brought were to be regarded as simply matter of procedure (which we do not assert), we still think it is not to be construed as apply/ng retrospectively. As it is only a question of inten- tion we are not prepared to hold that the section is prospec- tive in its operation in regard to all its other provisions, but retrospective in the one instance, as to the district in which the suit is to be commenced. Even matters of procedure are not necessarily retrospective in their operation in a statute, and we see nc reason for holding that, this statute, of but one section, should be split up in its construction, and one por-
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