RICHARDSON ?. SHAW. ?l? 209 U.S. Syllabus. on page 254. The court, speaking by Mr. Justice Mood?, said: "The principle governing these decisions, so plain that it needs no reasoning to support it, is that tho6e who seek and obtain the benefit of a charter of incorporation must take the benefit under the conditions and with the burdens prescribed by the law then in fqree, whether written in the Constitution, in general laws or in the charter itself." The formation of the consolidated company was not imposed upon the complainant; it had the privilege of standing upon such rights as it had by contract or otherwise under the former legislation in force before the. adoption of the new constitution. When it saw fit to enter into the consolidation and form a new corporation in 1892 the constitution then in force in the State became the law of its corporate being, and the requirement that corporate property should not be exempt from taxation then became binding upon it, as upon all Other corporations formed under the new organic law. We find no error in the judgment of the Circuit Court for the Southern District of M}ssissippi, and the same is RICHARDSON, TRUSTEE IN BANKRUFI?Y v. SHAW. CERTIORARI TO q?E CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. No. 1 ?'?. Arg?d January 17, ?0, l$08.--?dmd ?pril 8, 1?}?. While a broker who carries stocks for a customer on margin may not be strictly a pledgee at common law, he is essentially a pledgee and not the owner of the stock. Markham v. Jaudoa, 41 N.Y. 235, approved. Neither the right of the broker to repledge stock cer?ied on margin for a customer, nor his right to sell such stock for his protection when the margin is exhausted, altem the relation of the parties, is inconsistent with the customer's ownership, or converts the broker into the owner of the stock.
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