for Defendsat. West Virginia does not and could not successfully here con- test the principles thus laid down, but the principles of equity and the rules of ?hancery procedure so far as essential to pro- tect the rights of parties litigating in this tribunal will, of course, be substantially enforced. The application of some of the rules of procedure are certainly essential to substantial justice. 2 Bates, Fed. Eq. pro. 802, �3. Thus it stands alleged in the bill and admitted by the answer, and if it were not admitted by the answer, it is conclusively tablished by the bill and its exhibits, that there was a solen?u agreement entered into in 1861 between the State of Virginia and the new State of West Virginia, with the consent of the Congress, by which the latter State assumed (as one of the conditions of the assent of Virginia to her becoming a State) a just proportion of the indebtedness of that Commonwealth as it existed prior to January 1, 1861, the manner of ascertaining which proportion was defined by the ordinance itself. The ordinance was, as treated by this court in the case of Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wallace, 39, a proposition by the Commonwealth of Virginia to the pcopl? of the proposed new State. It was accepted by the constitutional convention of the proposed new State, carried into its constitution and adopted by t?he people; and when the State was admitted into the Union by the Congress, with the assent of Virginia, it be- came a completed compact bet?vccn co,npelcnt parties, upon, adequate consideration, protected by the Constitution of the United States from impairment by either pariy. The ordln?,?ce defines what would be a just proportion; for it provides not only for the assumption of a just proportion, but specifically in what manner that proportion shall be ascertained. The obligation of a lawful compact between. two States, justiciable in its nat, me, certainly is as binding in law upon both until abrogated by both in a constitutional way, as a contract between a State and an individual, or between two individuals, and a disregard or violation of it by one, certainly cannot thereby release it from its obligation.
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