thorities sustain all these positions.[1] Before the statute of 11 Geo. II., regulating the appearance of landlords as defendants in lieu of the casual ejector, a judgment in ejectment was habitually set aside, where, upon the complaint of the landlord, it appeared, that he had had no notice of the suit. Where a party sells a chattel with warranty of title, notice to the vendor, of a suit against the vendee for it, is sufficient to bind the vendor by the verdict or judgment in that suit. One obtaining possession of land, while an action of ejectment is pending, is answerable for the mesne profits during his occupation; whether proved to have had notice of the action or not; constructive notice then sometimes implicates a third party in this suit.[2] All these rules are calculated to prevent an evasion of the statute, allowing landlords, not in actual possession, to be actors in the ejectment suit, and to keep the fictions of law to their original purposes of justice. Our claim is clear of the point of Lifford’s case, in 11 Co. 51.; though according to the decisions in Massachusetts, we might rest this suit even upon that point.[3] Before the statute of Marlbridge, 52 Hen. III., damages was not recoverable in any
- ↑ 1 Burr. 667. Runningl. Eject. 192, 193, 198, 200, 201. Adams’ Eject. 328, 337. 2 Johns. Cas. 438. 3 Camp. 455. in point, and inaccurately stated in Adams on Eject.; the notice of the suit to the landlord not being required, as Adams states, to be by service of the declaration in ejectment. 2 Burr. 1299. 7 T. R. 108.
- ↑ 13 Johns. Rep. 447. 1 Harris and Johns. Maryland Rep.
- ↑ Stearnes on Real Actions. 416.
