Breyer, J., dissenting
enhanced accuracy that are no longer relevant after Teague. See post, at 365. But we held in that case that "[a]ll three factors favor only prospective application of the rule." 392 U.S., at 633 (emphasis added). Thus, the result would have been the same even if enhanced accuracy were the sole criterion for retroactivity.[1]
***
The right to jury trial is fundamental to our system of criminal procedure, and States are bound to enforce the Sixth Amendment's guarantees as we interpret them. But it does not follow that, when a criminal defendant has had a full trial and one round of appeals in which the State faith fully applied the Constitution as we understood it at the time, he may nevertheless continue to litigate his claims indefinitely in hopes that we will one day have a change of heart. Ring announced a new procedural rule that does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review. The contrary judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice
Souter, and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting.
In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), this Court held that a jury, not a judge, must make the findings necessary to
- ↑ The dissent distinguishes DeStefano on the ground that "this case involves only a small subclass of defendants deprived of jury trial rights, the relevant harm within that subclass is more widespread, the administration of justice problem is far less serious, and the reliance interest less weighty." Post, at 366. But the first, third, and fourth of these points are irrelevant under Teague, and the second, insofar as it relates to accuracy, is an unsubstantiated assertion. If jury trial significantly enhances accuracy, we would not have been able to hold as we did in DeStefano that the first factor—"prevent[ing] arbitrariness and repression," 392 U.S., at 633—did not favor retroactivity.
