O'Connor, J., dissenting
are bound by Elstad to reach a different result, and I would vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri.
I
On two preliminary questions I am in full agreement with the plurality. First, the plurality appropriately follows Elstad in concluding that Seibert's statement cannot be held inadmissible under a "fruit of the poisonous tree" theory. Ante, at 612, n. 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the plurality correctly declines to focus its analysis on the subjective intent of the interrogating officer.
A
This Court has made clear that there simply is no place for a robust deterrence doctrine with regard to violations of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 (2000) ("Our decision in [Elstad]—refusing to apply the traditional 'fruits' doctrine developed in Fourth Amendment cases—. . .simply recognizes the fact that unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth Amendment"); Elstad, supra, at 306 (unlike the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, the "Miranda exclusionary rule. . .serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself"); see also United States v. Patane, post, at 644–645 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (refusal to suppress evidence obtained following an unwarned confession in Elstad, New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), and Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), was based on "our recognition that the concerns underlying the Miranda . . . rule must be accommodated to other objectives of the criminal justice system"). Consistent with that view, the Court today refuses to apply the traditional "fruits" analysis to the physical fruit of a claimed Miranda violation. Patane, post, p. 630. The plu-
