OCTOBER TERM, 2003
55
Syllabus
NORTON, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al. v. SOUTHERN UTAH WILDERNESS ALLIANCE et al.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-101.
Argued March 29, 2004—Decided June 14, 2004
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM), an Interior Department agency, manages the Utah land at issue here under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976. Pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 1782, the Secretary of the Interior has identified certain federal lands as "wilderness study areas" (WSAs) and recommended some of these as suitable for wilderness designation. Land designated as wilderness by Act of Congress enjoys special protection; until Congress acts, the Secretary must "manage [WSAs] . . . so as not to impair the[ir] suitability . . . for preservation as wilderness." § 1782(c). In addition, each WSA or other area is managed "in accordance with" a land use plan, § 1732(a), a BLM document which generally describes, for a particular area, allowable uses, goals for the land's future condition, and next steps. 43 CFR § 1601.0–5(k). Respondents Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance and others (collectively SUWA) sought declaratory and injunctive relief for BLM's failure to act to protect Utah public lands from environmental damage caused by off road vehicles (ORVs), asserting three claims relevant here, and contending that they could sue under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed," 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). The Tenth Circuit reversed the District Court's dismissal of the claims.
Held: BLM's alleged failures to act are not remediable under the APA. Pp. 61–73.
(a) A § 706(1) claim can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take. The discrete action limitation precludes a broad programmatic attack such as that rejected in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, and the required action limitation rules out judicial direction of even discrete agency action that is not demanded by law. Pp. 61–65.
(b) SUWA first claims that BLM violated § 1782(c)'s nonimpairment mandate by permitting ORV use in certain WSAs. While § 1782(c) is mandatory as to the object to be achieved, it leaves BLM discretion to decide how to achieve that object. SUWA argues that the nonimpairment mandate will support an APA suit, but a general deficiency in compliance lacks the requisite specificity. The principal purpose of this