APPENDIX. PROCLALIATION. N 0. 26. 777 be done through gross error, or to deceive those who are willing to assert a right, but would pause before they made a revolution, or incur the penalties consequent on afailure. Because the Union was formed by compact, it is said the parties to that compact may, when they feel themselves aggrieved, depart from it; but it is precisely ecause it is a compact that they cannot. A compact is an agreement or binding obligation. It may by its terms have a sanction or penalty for its breach, or it may not. If it contains no sanction, it may be broken with no other conmuence than moral guilt; if it have a sanction, then the breach incurs the designated or implied penalty. A league between independent nations, generally, has no sanction, other than a mora one; or if it should contain a penalty, as there is no common superior, it cannot be enforced. A government, on the oontx·a3·, always has a sanction, express or implied; and, in our case, it is both necessay implied and expressly given. An attem t, by force of arms, to destroy a government, is an ofence, by whatever means the constitutional compact may have been formed; and such government has the right, by the law of selfdefence, to pass acts for punishing the offender, unless that right is modified, restrained, or resumed by the constitutional act. In our system, although it is modified in the case of treason, yet authority is expressly given to pass all laws necessary to carry its powers into effect, and under this grant, provision has been made for punishing acts which obstruct the due administration of the laws. It would seem superiiuous to add any thing to show the nature of that union which connects us; but, as erroneous opinions on this subject are the foundation of doctrines the most destructive to our peace, I must give some further devel- · opment to my views on this subject. No one, fellow-citizens, has a higher reverence for the reserved rivhts of the States, than the Magistrate who now addresses you. No one would mzilze greater personal sacrifices, or official exertions, to defend them from violation; but equal care must be taken to prevent, on their part, an improper interference with, or resumption oi·Q the rights they have vested in the nation. The line has not been so distinctly drawn as to avoid doubts in some cues of the exercise of power. Men of the best intentions and soundest views may differ in their construction of some parts of the Constitution ; but there are others on which dispassionate reflection can leave no doubt. Of this nature appears to be the assumed right of secession. It rests, as we have seen, on the a leged undivided sovereignty of the States, and on their having formed, in this sovereivn capacity, a compact which is called the Constitution, from which, because they made it, they have the right to secede. Both of these positions are erroneous, and some of the arguments to prove them so have been anticipated. The States severally have not retained their entire sovereignty. It has been shown that, in becoming parts of a nation, not members of o league, they surrendered many of their essential parts of sovereignty. The right to make treaties—declare war-—-levy taxes—exercise exclusive judicial and legislative p1owers——were all of them functions of sovereign power. The States, then, for a these important purposes, were no longer sovereign. The allegiance of their citizens was transferred, in the first instance, to the government of the United States-—they became American citizens, and owed obedience to the Constitution of the United States, and to laws made in conformity with the wers it vested in Congress. This last ition has not been, and cannot be dldiiied. How, then, can that State be be soverei n and independent whose citizens owe obedience to laws not made by it, and whose magistrates are sworn to disregard those laws when they come in coniiict with those passed by another? What shows conclusively that the States cannot be said to have reserved an nmdivided sovereignty, is, that they expressly ceded the right to punish treason—n0t treason against their separate power-but treason against the United States. Treason is an offence against sovereignty, and soverei nty must reside with the ower to punish it. But the reserved rights of the States are not less sacred hecause they have, for their common interest, made the general government the depository of these powers. The unity of our political character (as has been shown for another purpose) commenced with its very existence. Under the royal government we had no se rate character; our opposition to its oppressions began as United Colonies. Vg: were the United States under the confederation, and the name was perpetuated, and the Union rendered more perfect by the Federal Constitution. In none of these stages did we consider ourselves in any other light than as forming one nation. Treaties and alliances were made in the name of all. Troops were raised for the joint defence. How, then, with all these proofs, that, under all changes of our position we had, for designated purposes and vdth defined powers, created national governmentshow is it, that_t c most perfect of those several modes of union should now be von. xr. Arr.-101
