SIXTH CONGRESS.Sess. II. Ch. 15.1801.
as they now exist, shall be and continue in force in that part of the said district, which was ceded by that state to the United States, and by them accepted as aforesaid.
It shall be formed into two counties.
Washington county.
Alexandria county.Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That the said district of Columbia shall be formed into two counties; one county shall contain all that part of said district, which lies on the east side of the river Potomac, together with the islands therein, and shall be called the county of Washington; the other county shall contain all that part of said district, which lies on the west side of said river, and shall be called the county of Alexandria; and the said river in its whole course through said district shall be taken and deemed to all intents and purposes to be within both of said counties.
To consist of one chief judge and two assistant judges.Sec. 3. Be it further enacted, That there shall be a court in said district, which shall be called the circuit court of the district of Columbia; and the said court and the judges thereof shall have all the powers by law vested in the circuit courts and the judges of the circuit courts of the United States. Said court shall consist of one chief judge and two assistant judges resident within said district, to hold their respective offices during good behaviour; any two of whom shall constitute a quorum; and each of the said judges shall, before he enter on his office, take the oath or affirmation provided by law to be taken by the
to that separation he had entitled himself to a discharge by performing all the requisites of the act. Reilly v. Lamar et al. 2 Cranch, 344; 1 Cond. Rep, 419.
No appeal or writ of error lies, in a criminal case, from the judgment of the circuit court of the District of Columbia, to the supreme court of the United States: the appellate jurisdiction given by the act of Congress, is confined to civil cases. United States v. Moore, 3 Cranch, 159; 1 Cond. Rep. 480. There is, in the District of Columbia, no division of powers between the general and state governments. Congress has the entire control over the district, for every purpose of government: and it is reasonable to suppose that, in organizing a judicial department in the district, all the judicial power, necessary for the purpose of government, would be vested in the courts of justice. Kendall, Postmaster General v. The United States, 12 Peters, 524. The circuit court of the United States, for the District of Columbia, has a right to award a mandamus to the postmaster-general of the United States, requiring him to pass to the credit of certain contractors for conveying the mail of the United States, a sum found to be due to them by the solicitor of the treasury of the United States, the solicitor acting under the special provisions of an act of Congress. Ibid. There can be no doubt, that, in the state of Maryland, a writ of mandamus might be issued to an executive officer, commanding him to perform a ministerial act, required of him by the laws: and if it would lie in that state, there can be no good reason why it should not lie in the District of Columbia, in analogous cases. Ibid. The powers of the supreme court of the United States, and of the circuit courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus, granted by the fourteenth section of the judiciary act of 1789, is only for the purpose of bringing the case to a final judgment or decree, so that it may be reviewed. The mandamus does not direct the inferior court how to proceed, but only that it must proceed, according to its own judgment, to a final determination; otherwise it cannot be reviewed in the appellate court. It is different in the circuit court of the District of Columbia, under the adoption of the laws of Maryland, which included the common law. Ibid. The power of the circuit court of the District of Columbia, to exercise the jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus to a public officer, to do an act required of him by law, results from the third section of the act of Congress of February 27, 1804; which declares that the court and judges thereof shall have all the powers by law vested in the circuit courts of the United States. The circuit courts referred to, were those established by the act of February 13, 1801. The repeal of that law, fifteen months afterwards, and after that law had gone into operation, under the act of February 27, 1801, could not in any manner affect that law, any further than was provided by the repealing act. Ibid. The circuit courts of the United States, sitting in the states of the Union, have no jurisdiction in a case in which a citizen of the District of Columbia is plaintiff. Westcott’s Lessee v. Inhabitants, &c. Peters’ C. C. R. 45. The act of Congress of June, 1822, authorizes any person to whom administration has been granted by the states of the United States, to prosecute claims by suits in the District of Columbia, in the same manner as if the same had been granted by proper authority, in the District of Columbia, to such persons. The power is limited by its terms to the institution of suits, and does not authorize suits against an executor or administrator. The effect of this law was to make all debts due by persons in the District of Columbia, not local assets, for which the administrator was bound to account in the courts of the district, but general assets which he had full authority to receive, and for which he was bound to account in the courts of the state from which he derived his letters of administration. Vaughan et al. v. Northup et al., 15 Peters’ Rep. 1. The courts of the United States in the District of Columbia, have a like jurisdiction upon personal property, with the courts in England, and in the states of the Union; and in the absence of statutory provisions, in the trial of them they must apply the same common law principle which regulates the mode of bringing such actions, the pleadings and the proof. M‘Kenna v. Fiske, 17 Peters’ Rep. 245.