Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 2.djvu/324

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ceeding subsequent thereto, of whatsoever nature, towards the obtaining any grant, title, or claim to such lands, and under whatsoever authority transacted, or pretended, be, and the same are hereby declared to be, and to have been from the beginning, null, void, and of no effect in law or equity.^[1] Provided nevertheless, that any thing in this section con-

↑ Decisions of the Supreme Court on Louisiana land titles:—By the treaty of St. Ildefonso, made on the 1st of October, 1800, Spain ceded Louisiana to France; and France, by the treaty of Paris, signed the 30th of April, 1803, ceded it to the United States. Under this treaty the United States claimed the countries between the Iberville and the Perdido. Spain contended that her cession to France comprehended only that territory which at the time of the cession was denominated Louisiana, consisting of the island of New Orleans, and the country which had been originally ceded to her by France, west of the Mississippi. The land claimed by the plaintiffs in error, under a grant from the crown of Spain, made after the treaty of St. Ildefonso, lies within the disputed territory; and this case presents the question, to whom did the country between the Iberville and the Perdido belong after the treaty of St. Ildefonso? Had France and Spain agreed upon the boundaries of the retroceded territory, before Louisiana was acquired by the United States, that agreement would undoubtedly have ascertained its limits. But the declarations of France, made after parting with the province, cannot be admitted as conclusive. In questions of this character, political considerations have too much influence over the conduct of nations, to permit their declarations to decide the course of an independent government, in a matter vitally interesting to itself. Foster et al. v. Neilson, 2 Peters, 254.
If a Spanish grantee had obtained possession of the land in dispute so as to be the defendant, would a court of the United States maintain his title under a Spanish grant, made subsequent to the acquisition of Louisiana, singly on the principle that the Spanish construction of the treaty of St. Ildefonso was right, and the American construction wrong? Such a decision would subvert those principles which govern the relations between the legislative and judicial departments, and mark the limits of each. Ibid. 309.
The sound construction of the 8th article of the treaty between the United States and Spain, of the 22d of February, 1829, will not enable the court to apply its provisions to the case of the plaintiff. Ibid. 314.
The article does not declare that all the grants made by his Catholic majesty before the 24th of January, 1818, shall be valid to the same extent as if the ceded territories had remained under his dominion. It does not say that those grants are hereby confirmed. Had such been its language, it would have acted directly on the subject, and it would have repealed those acts of Congress which were repugnant to it; but its language is that those grants shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession, &c. By whom shall they be ratified and confirmed? This seems to be the language of contract; and if it is, the ratification and confirmation which are promised must be the act of the legislature. Until such act shall be passed, the court is not at liberty to disregard the existing laws on the subject. Ibid.
The controversy in relation to the country lying between the Mississippi and the Perdido river, and the validity of the grants made by Spain in the disputed territory, after the cession of Louisiana to the United States, were carefully examined and decided in the case of Foster and Elam v. Neilson. The supreme court, in that case, decided that the question of boundary between the United States and Spain was a question for the political departments of the government; that the legislative and executive branches having decided the question, the courts of the United States are bound to regard the boundary determined by them as the true one; the grants made by the Spanish authorities of lands, which, according to this boundary line belonged to the Untied States, gave no title to the grantees, in opposition to those caiming under the United States; unless the Spanish grants were protected by the subsequent arrangements made between the two governments; and that no such arrangements were to be found in the treaty of 1819, by which Spain ceded the Floridas to the United States, according to the fair import of its words, and its true construction. Garcia v. Lee, 12 Peters, 511.
In the case of Foster and Elam v. Neilson, the supreme court said, that the Florida treaty of 1819 declares that all grants made before the 24th January, 1818, by the Spanish authorities, “shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands, to the same extent that the same grants would be valid, if the territories had remained under the dominion of his Catholic majesty:” and in deciding the case of Foster and Elam, the court held that even if this stipulation applied to lands in the territory in question, yet the words used did not import a present confirmation by virtue of the treaty itself, but that they were words of contract; “that the ratification and confirmation, which were promised, must be the act of the legislature; and until such shall be passed, the court is not at liberty to disregard the existing laws on the subject.” Afterwards, in the case of the United States v. Percheman, 7 Peters, 86, in reviewing the words of the eighth article of the treaty, the court, for the reasons there assigned, came to a different conclusion; and held that the words were words of present confirmation, by the treaty, where the land had been rightfully granted before the cession; and that it did not need the aid of an act of Congress to ratify and confirm the grant. This language was, however, applied by the court, and was intended to apply to grants made in a territory which belonged to Spain at the time of the grant. The case then before the court was one of that description. It was in relation to a grant of land in Florida, which unquestionably belonged to Spain at the time the grant was made; and where the Spanish authorities had an undoubted right to grant, until the treaty of cession in 1819. It is of such grants that the court speak, when they declare them to be confirmed and protected by the true construction of the treaty; and that they do not need the aid of an act of Congress to ratify and confirm the title of the purchaser. The court do not apply this principle to grants made within the territory of Louisiana. The case of Foster and Elam v. Neilson, must in all other respects be considered as affirmed by the case of Percheman; as it underwent a careful examination in that case, and as none of its principles were questioned, except that referred to Garcia v. Lee, 12 Peters, 511.
The acts of the commissioners appointed to adjust and settle land titles in Louisiana, under the acts of Congress authorizing and confirming the same, are conclusive as to all titles to lands which have been confirmed, according to the provisions of the different acts of Congress on the subject. Strother v. Lucas, 12 Peters, 410. See also The United States v. Percheman, 7 Peters, 86.

[1] Decisions of the Supreme Court on Louisiana land titles:—By the treaty of St. Ildefonso, made on the 1st of October, 1800, Spain ceded Louisiana to France; and France, by the treaty of Paris, signed the 30th of April, 1803, ceded it to the United States. Under this treaty the United States claimed the countries between the Iberville and the Perdido. Spain contended that her cession to France comprehended only that territory which at the time of the cession was denominated Louisiana, consisting of the island of New Orleans, and the country which had been originally ceded to her by France, west of the Mississippi. The land claimed by the plaintiffs in error, under a grant from the crown of Spain, made after the treaty of St. Ildefonso, lies within the disputed territory; and this case presents the question, to whom did the country between the Iberville and the Perdido belong after the treaty of St. Ildefonso? Had France and Spain agreed upon the boundaries of the retroceded territory, before Louisiana was acquired by the United States, that agreement would undoubtedly have ascertained its limits. But the declarations of France, made after parting with the province, cannot be admitted as conclusive. In questions of this character, political considerations have too much influence over the conduct of nations, to permit their declarations to decide the course of an independent government, in a matter vitally interesting to itself. Foster et al. v. Neilson, 2 Peters, 254.
If a Spanish grantee had obtained possession of the land in dispute so as to be the defendant, would a court of the United States maintain his title under a Spanish grant, made subsequent to the acquisition of Louisiana, singly on the principle that the Spanish construction of the treaty of St. Ildefonso was right, and the American construction wrong? Such a decision would subvert those principles which govern the relations between the legislative and judicial departments, and mark the limits of each. Ibid. 309.
The sound construction of the 8th article of the treaty between the United States and Spain, of the 22d of February, 1829, will not enable the court to apply its provisions to the case of the plaintiff. Ibid. 314.
The article does not declare that all the grants made by his Catholic majesty before the 24th of January, 1818, shall be valid to the same extent as if the ceded territories had remained under his dominion. It does not say that those grants are hereby confirmed. Had such been its language, it would have acted directly on the subject, and it would have repealed those acts of Congress which were repugnant to it; but its language is that those grants shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession, &c. By whom shall they be ratified and confirmed? This seems to be the language of contract; and if it is, the ratification and confirmation which are promised must be the act of the legislature. Until such act shall be passed, the court is not at liberty to disregard the existing laws on the subject. Ibid.
The controversy in relation to the country lying between the Mississippi and the Perdido river, and the validity of the grants made by Spain in the disputed territory, after the cession of Louisiana to the United States, were carefully examined and decided in the case of Foster and Elam v. Neilson. The supreme court, in that case, decided that the question of boundary between the United States and Spain was a question for the political departments of the government; that the legislative and executive branches having decided the question, the courts of the United States are bound to regard the boundary determined by them as the true one; the grants made by the Spanish authorities of lands, which, according to this boundary line belonged to the Untied States, gave no title to the grantees, in opposition to those caiming under the United States; unless the Spanish grants were protected by the subsequent arrangements made between the two governments; and that no such arrangements were to be found in the treaty of 1819, by which Spain ceded the Floridas to the United States, according to the fair import of its words, and its true construction. Garcia v. Lee, 12 Peters, 511.
In the case of Foster and Elam v. Neilson, the supreme court said, that the Florida treaty of 1819 declares that all grants made before the 24th January, 1818, by the Spanish authorities, “shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands, to the same extent that the same grants would be valid, if the territories had remained under the dominion of his Catholic majesty:” and in deciding the case of Foster and Elam, the court held that even if this stipulation applied to lands in the territory in question, yet the words used did not import a present confirmation by virtue of the treaty itself, but that they were words of contract; “that the ratification and confirmation, which were promised, must be the act of the legislature; and until such shall be passed, the court is not at liberty to disregard the existing laws on the subject.” Afterwards, in the case of the United States v. Percheman, 7 Peters, 86, in reviewing the words of the eighth article of the treaty, the court, for the reasons there assigned, came to a different conclusion; and held that the words were words of present confirmation, by the treaty, where the land had been rightfully granted before the cession; and that it did not need the aid of an act of Congress to ratify and confirm the grant. This language was, however, applied by the court, and was intended to apply to grants made in a territory which belonged to Spain at the time of the grant. The case then before the court was one of that description. It was in relation to a grant of land in Florida, which unquestionably belonged to Spain at the time the grant was made; and where the Spanish authorities had an undoubted right to grant, until the treaty of cession in 1819. It is of such grants that the court speak, when they declare them to be confirmed and protected by the true construction of the treaty; and that they do not need the aid of an act of Congress to ratify and confirm the title of the purchaser. The court do not apply this principle to grants made within the territory of Louisiana. The case of Foster and Elam v. Neilson, must in all other respects be considered as affirmed by the case of Percheman; as it underwent a careful examination in that case, and as none of its principles were questioned, except that referred to Garcia v. Lee, 12 Peters, 511.
The acts of the commissioners appointed to adjust and settle land titles in Louisiana, under the acts of Congress authorizing and confirming the same, are conclusive as to all titles to lands which have been confirmed, according to the provisions of the different acts of Congress on the subject. Strother v. Lucas, 12 Peters, 410. See also The United States v. Percheman, 7 Peters, 86.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 2.djvu/324

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