Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That, from and after the thirtieth day of September next, if any officer employed, or who has heretofore been employed, in the civil, military, or naval, departments of the government, to disburse the public money appropriated for the service of those
An execution is the end of the law. It gives the successful party the fruits of his judgment, and the distress warrant is a most effective execution. It may act on the body and estate of the individual against whom it is directed. Ibid.
It would excite some surprise if, in a government of laws and of principle, furnished with a department whose appropriate duty is to decide questions of right, not only between individuals, but between the government and individuals, a ministerial officer might, at his discretion, issue this powerful process, and levy on the person, lands, and chattels of the debtor, any sum he might believe to be due, leaving to that debtor no remedy, no appeal to the laws of his country, if he should believe the claim to be unjust. But this anomaly does not exist; this imputation cannot be cast on the legislature of the United States.Under the act of Congress the chief justice of the District of Columbia had full jurisdiction over the case. Ibid.After a reference to auditors, according to the course of courts of chancery in matters of account, a final decree was pronounced against the United States, and a perpetual injunction awarded. This decree is now in full force, and was in force when this suit was instituted. The act of Congress gave jurisdiction in the specific case to the district judge. He might have enjoined the whole or a part of the warrant. His decree might have been for or against the United States for the whole or a part of the claim. On the sum which he found to be due, he is directed to assess the lawful interest; he may add such damages, as with the interest, shall not exceed the rate of ten per cent. per annum on the principal sum. Had the district judge finally enjoined a part of the sum claimed by the United States, and decreed that the residue should be paid with interest, all would perceive the unfitness of asserting a claim in a new action to that portion of the debt which had been enjoined by the decree of the court. And, yet between the obligation of a decree, against the whole claim, and against a part of it, no distinction is perceived. Ibid. The relief which is given by the act of Congress on which the warrant of distress may be issued, by application to any district judge of the United States for an injunction to stay proceedings on such warrant, is not confined to an officer employed in the civil, military, or naval departments of the government, to disburse the public money appropriated for the service of those dpeartments respectively, who shall fail to render his accounts, or pay over in the manner required by law, any sum of money remaining in the hands of such officer. Ibid. When the legislature turns its attention to the individual against whom the warrant may issue, the language of the law is immediately changed. The word person is substituted for officer; and it declares, “that if any person should consider himself aggrieved by any warrant issued under this act, he may prefer a bill of complaint, &c.,” and thereupon the judge may grant an injunction, &c. Ibid.The character of the individual against whom the warrant may be issued is entirely disregarded by that part of the law. Be he whom he may, an officer or not an officer, a debtor or not a debtor; if the warrant be levied on his person or property, he is permitted to appeal to the laws of his country, and to bring his case before the district judge, to be adjudicated by him. Ibid.The district judge had full jurisdiction over the case, and his decision is final. The judgment on the warrant of distress, and the proceedings upon it are, consequently, a bar to any subsequent action for the same case. Ibid.A party was arrested and held in custody, by virtue of a distress warrant, issued from the Treasury Department, under an act of Congress passed the 15th of May, 1820, “to provide for the better organization of the Treasury Department.” The act provides, in substance, for the issuing of this warrant by the agent of the treasury, against all military and naval officers, &c., charged with the disbursement of the public moneys, who shall fail to pay and settle their accounts at the Treasury Department. The party in custody, was a lieutenant in the navy of the United States, and had officiated as acting purser of a national ship, supplying a vacancy occasioned by the death of the regularly commissioned purser of the ship, on the Mediterranean station, and had executed no official bond as purser. On his return to the United States, he had settled his account at the proper department, viz., in 1828; and in 1833, the then fourth auditor, opened and re-stated his account, on the ground that it had been erroneously settled in the first instance, and the account as re-stated, exhibited a large balance against the party, due to the United States. Upon this re-stated account, the distress warrant was issued, by virtue whereof, the party was arrested and was brought before the circuit court under a writ of habeas corpus, directed to the officer, who executed the warrant, and held the petitioner in custody. Held, That the account of the petitioner as acting purser, having been once stated, and settled at the Treasury Department, the law invests the auditor with no power to open and re-settle it, of his own mere authority. The act creates a special and limited jurisdiction; and after the accounts of any class of officers, on whom it was intended to act, have been adjusted, however erroneously, that special jurisdiction is functus officio, and any process issued upon a re-establishment of such accounts, is absolutely null and void.Barbour, J. That, assuming the act, under which this arrest was made, does not violate the Constitution of the United States, which declares, that “the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as Congress shall, from time to time, ordain and establish; the judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour,” and extends the judicial power to “controversies to which the United States shall be a party:” yet, the authority vested by this law in certain agents of the treasury, and all acts done in pursuance thereof, are purely ministerial. The statement or certificate, authorized by the act, is not a judgment, and the warrant which coerces payment, is not judicial process. They are ministerial acts, (for, otherwise, they could not be sustained,) and the general principles of construction require, that the authority vested by the act, shall be strictly and literally pursued. Per Marshall,