The eighth article of the Florida treaty stipulates, that “grants of land made by Spain, in Florida, after the 24th of January, 1818, shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the land, to the same extend that the same grants would be valid, if the government of the territory had remained under the dominion of Spain.” The government of the United States may take advantage of the non-performance of the conditions prescribed by the law relative to grants of land, if the treaty does not provide for the omission. Ibid.
In the cases of Arredondo, 6 Peters, 691, and Percheman, 7 Peters, 54, it was held, that the words in the Florida treaty, “shall be ratified and confirmed;” in reference to perfect titles, should be construed, “are ratified and confirmed.” The object of the court in these cases was to exempt them from the operation of the eighth article, for that they were perfect titles by the laws of Spain, when the treaty was made; and that when the soil and sovereignty of Florida were ceded by the second article, private rights of property were, by implication, protected. By the law of nations, the rights to property are secured when territories are ceded; and to reconcile the eighth article of the treaty with the law of nations, the Spanish side of the article was referred to in aid of the American side. The court held, that perfect titles “stood confirmed” by the treaty; and must be so recognised by the United States, in our courts. Ibid. Perfect titles to lands, made by Spain in the territory of Florida before the 24th January, 1818, were intrinsically valid, and exempt from the provision of the eighth article of the treaty; and they need no sanction from the legislative or judicial departments of the United States. Ibid. The eighth article of the Florida treaty was intended to apply to claims to land whose validity depended on the performance of conditions, in consideration of which the concessions had been made; and which must have been performed before Spain was abound to perfect the titles. The United States were bound after the cession of the country, to the same extent that Spain had been bound before the ratification of the treaty, to perfect them by legislation and adjudication. Ibid. A grant of land by the government of Florida, made before the cession of Florida to the United States by Spain, confirmed: every point involved in the case having been conclusively settled by the court in their former adjudication in similar cases. The United States v. Waterman, 14 Peters, 478. The Supreme Court, in the case of United States v. Clark, 8 Peters, 48, say “that if the validity of the grant depends upon its being in conformity with the royal order of Spain of 1790, it cannot be supported;” but immediately proceeds to show, “though the royal order is recited in the grant, that it was, in fact, founded on the meritorious consideration of the petitioner having constructed a machine of great value for sawing timber; the recital of the royal order of 1790, in this grant, is entirely immaterial, and does not affect the instrument.” Held, the recital of the royal order, in this case, is quite immaterial. Ibid. The case of the United States v. Wiggins, 14 Peters, 325, which decided that certain proof of the certificate of Aguilar, secretary of East Florida, was sufficient, cited; and the decision on that point affirmed. Ibid. The Spanish governors of Florida had, by the laws of the Indies, power to make large grants to the subjects of the crowns of Spain. The royal order of Spain of 1790, applied to grants to foreigners. These grants, before the cession of Florida to the United States, had been sanctioned for many years by the king of Spain, and the authorities representing him in Cuba, the Floridas, and Louisiana. This authority has been frequently affirmed by the Supreme Court. Ibid. An application was made to the governor of Florida, in 1814, stating services performed by the petitioner for the government of Spain, and the intention of the petitioner to invest his means in the erection of a water saw-mill, and marking the place where the lands were situated which were asked for. The governor granted the land,referring to the merits and services of the applicant, and in consideration of the advantages which would result to the home and foreign trade by the use proposed to be made of the land. Held, that this was not a conditional grant; and that no evidence of the erection of a water saw-mill was required to be given to maintain its validity, or induce its confirmation. Ibid.
John Forbes by memorial to governor Kindelan, the governor of East Florida, set forth, that in 1799, there had been granted to Panton Leslie and company, for the purpose of pasturage, fifteen thousand acres of land, which they were obliged to abandon, as being of inferior quality. Forbes, as the successor to these grantees, asked to be permitted to abandon these fifteen thousand acres, and in lieu, to have granted to him ten thousand acres, as an equivalent, on Nassau river. The petition avers that the object was to establish a rice plantation. The petition was referred to the “Comptroller," who gave it as his opinion that the culture of rice should be promoted. Governor Kindelan permitted the abandonment of the fifteen thousand acres granted before, and in lieu thereof, granted to John Forbes, for the purpose of cultivating rice, ten thousand acres in the district, on the banks of the river Nassau. Surveys of seven thousand acres of land, at the head of the river “Little St. Mary” or “St Mary,” and three thousand acres in “Cabbage Swamp,” were made under this grant. No description of the locality of the land other than that in the certificate of the survey was given; nor do the surveys prove that the land surveyed lay in the district of the river Nassau. No evidence was given of the situation of “Cabbage Swamp.” Held, that these surveys were not made of the land granted by governor Kindelan; and according to the decisions of this court on all occasions, the surveys, to give them validity, must be in conformity with the grants on which they are founded; and to make them the origin of title, they must be of the land described in the grant of the Spanish government. The United States v. Forbes, 15 Peters, 173. The courts of justice can only adjudge what had been granted; and declare that the lands granted by the lawful authorities of Spain, are separated from the public domain: but where the land is expressly granted at one place, they have no power, by a decree, to grant an equivalent at another place,