1284 FIFTY-FIFTH CONGRESS. Sess. III. Ch. 429. 1899. Evid¤¤¤¤ si;:¤ bg Sec. 202. That any section of this Act which declares that evidence -:;5;Zzi;»“g¤»p;5§e. obtained upon the examination of a person as a witness shall not be °““°¤*°'P°'¤l“’Y· received against him in a criminal proceeding does not forbid such evidence being proved against such person upon any proceedings founded upon a charge of perjury committed by such person in such examination. <€¤t:*i¤**;¤}¤1ff9¤j¤¤¤ SEC; 203. That no conviction of any person for crime works any for- Zimxy. ° Q m feiture of any property, except in cases where the same is expressly . provided by law; but in all cases of the commission or attempt to commit a felony the United States has a lien from the time of such commission or attempt, upon all the property,of the defendant for the purpose of satisfying any judgment which may be given against him . for any iine on account thereof, and for the costs and disbursements in the proceedings against him for such crime.
M Sec. 204. That the several sections of this Act which declare certain
- `m.imP°°° P crimes to be punishable as therein mentioned devolve a duty upon the
court authorized to pass sentence to determine and impose the punishment prescribed; and whenever such puni hment is leit undetermined begwetgp certain limjts or kinds, to determine the punishment to be in ic in a particu ar case. Y In vt=:::¤¤¤¤ Q Sec. 205. That in all criminal prosecutions for libel the truth may Qixnsu •v1a:i7{g be given in evidence; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true and was published with good motives and justifiable ends, the defendant must be found not guilty. _ Prc¤¤¤r¤¤¤i¤{_£ Sec. 206. That an injurious publication is presumed to have been '§,,{{‘j"'”“° P" malicious if no justifiable end or good motive is shown for making it. "Dwelllng ncaa," Sec. 207. That any building is deemed a “dwelling house" within f,$§_”{§,*;;,; “‘ ""‘ the meaning of the sections of this Act defining the crime of arson = zany part of which has usually been occupied by any person lodging - erem. ·-nqm Muse." Sec. 208. That any building is deemed a “dwelling house" within
_"l" the meaning of the sections of this Act defining the crime of burglary
any part of which has usually been occupied by any person lodging theréegikzpd any structure joined to or immediately connected with suc ‘ u1 mg. _£=er$¤j;¤b;¤;T& gg _ Sec. 209. That whenever the terms mentioned in the following secmmumm. tions are employed in this Act they are deemed to be employed in the senses hereafter atlixed to them, except when a diiferent sense plainly appears. j·silgnmm·e,’ what _ Sec. 210. That the term “signature” includes any name, mark, or “ “"f’“· __ sign written with intent to authenticate any instrument or writing. PmfQQ;*éj"¤ ”'°‘“"°° Sec. 211. That the term “writing” includes printing. chghxgabgshrg-é and 1, 212. That the term “pr0perty” includes both real and personal , nonal. •
- °&¤i;•;::l;‘¥6•:¤¤¤·" Sec. 213. That the word “person" includes corporations as well as
natural persons; and where such word is used to designate the party whose piéopgty may be the subject of a crime, it includes said District, or any ta , government, or country which ma lawfnll own an r propeaty in said District, apd all municipal or public corporyations and prnva corporations, as we as individuals. MR: GQ1g:]:; °¤;{gj UISec. 21S!. That the singular number includes the plural, and the plural ral. B Slllgll 3f. _£·m¤3¤£Pnz;::£: milsé 2%:5. That wogrlisl used the masculine gender comprehend as e emimne an e neu r. w,fg{*;fxQHg’m°}f”•°“· Sec. 216. That whenever, by any provision of this Act, an intent to defraud is necessary to constitute a crime, it is sufficieut if an intent _ appears to defraud any person, body politic, or corporation whatever. ¤gf’Q§;“],0 gfgfjgé 217. That the omission to specify or affirm in this Act any liazma- remedy tl- psu bility to any damages, penalty, or torfeiture, or other remedy imposed Y by law, and allowed to be recovered or enforced in any civil action or proceeding, for any act or omission declared punishable herein, does not aifect any right to recover or enforce the same.
