Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 4.djvu/630

This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

TWENTY-SECOND CONGRESS.Sess. I. Ch. 227.1832.

shall be charged in conformity with such appraisal; on wool, unmanufactued, the value whereof, at the place of exportation, shall exceed eight cents, shall be levied four cents per pound, and forty per centum ad valorem: Proviso. Provided, That wool imported on the skin shall be estimated, as to weight and value, as other wool.

On manufactures of wool, or of which wool is a component part.Second. On all milled and fulled cloth, known by the name of plains, kerseys, or kendal cottons, of which wool shall be the only material, the value whereof shall not exceed thirty-five cents a square yard, five per centum ad valorem; on worsted stuff goods, shawls and other manufactures of silk and worsted, ten per centum ad valorem; on worsted yarn, twenty per centum ad valorem; on woollen yarn, four cents per pound, and fifty per centum ad valorem; on mits, gloves, bindings, blankets, hosiery and carpets and carpeting, twenty-five per centum, except Brussels, Wilton, and treble ingrained carpeting, which shall be at sixty-three cents the square yard; all other ingrained and Venetian carpeting, at thirty-five cents the square yard; and except blankets, the value whereof at the place from whence exported, shall not exceed seventy-five cents each, the duty to be levied upon which, shall be five per centum ad valorem; on flannels, bockings, and baizes, sixteen cents the square yard; on coach laces, thirty-five per centum; and upon merino shawls made of wool, all other manufactures of wool, or of which wool is a component part, and on ready-made clothing, fifty per centum ad valorem.^[1]

↑ Under the act of Congress passed July 14, 1832, ch. 227, entitled “An act to alter and amend the several acts imposing duties on imports,” worsted shawls with cotton borders, and worsted suspenders with cotton straps or ends, are not subjected to a duty of fifty per cent. ad valorem. Elliott v. Swartwout, 10 Peters, 137.
Laws imposing duties on goods are intended for practical use and application by men engaged in commerce, and hence it has become a settled rule in the interpretation of statutes of this description to construe the language adopted by the legislature, and particularly in the denomination of articles, according to the commercial understanding of the terms used. Ibid.
Construction of statutes:
The principles applied in the courts of the United States, in relation to the construction of statutes of the United States, and of statutes in general.
The suspension of a statute for a limited time, is not a repeal of it. Brown, plaintiff in error, v. Barry, 3 Dall. 365; 1 Cond. Rep. 165.
The intention of the legislature, when discovered, must prevail; any rule of construction, declared by previous acts, to the contrary notwithstanding. Ibid.
The presumption must always be in favour of the validity of a law if the contrary is not clearly demonstrated. Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 14; 1 Cond. Rep. 211.
A legislative act founded on a mistaken opinion of what was law, does not change the actual state of the law, as to pre-existing cases. Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch 1; 1 Cond. Rep. 239.
It is true, that in mere private cases between individuals, a court will and ought to struggle hard against a construction, which will, by a retrospective operation, affect the rights of parties; but in great national concerns, where individual rights acquired by war are sacrificed for national purposes, the contract making the sacrifice ought always to receive a construction conforming to its manifest import; and if the nation has given up the vested rights of its citizens, it is not for the court, but for the government, to consider whether it be a case proper for compensation. United States v. The Schooner Peggy. 1 Cranch, 103; 1 Cond. Rep. 256.
If the courts are to regard the constitution, and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; 1 Cond. Rep. 267.
In the construction of a statute, positive and explicit provisions, comprehending in terms a whole class of cases, are not to be restrained by applying to those cases an implication drawn from subsequent words; unless that implication be very clear, necessary, and irresistible. Faw v. Marsteller, 2 Cranch, 10; 1 Cond. Rep. 337.
Where a case is shown to be out of the mischief intended to be guarded against, or out of the spirit of the law; the letter of the statute will not be deemed so unequivocal as absolutely to exclude another construction. Ibid.
It is said the case ought to be an extraordinary one, that the circumstances ought to be uncommon, which would warrant a departure from the general principles established for the government of contracts. This is true, and the Supreme Court would certainly not feel itself at liberty to exercise, on a common occasion, a discretionary power, limited only by the opinion entertained of the naked justice of the case. Ibid.
That a law is the best expositor of itself; that every part of an act is to be taken into view for the purpose of discovering the mind of the legislature; and that the details of one part may contain regulations restricting the extent of general expressions used in another part of the same act; are among those plain rules laid down by common sense for the exposition of statutes, which have been uniformly acknowledged. Pennington v. Coxe, 2 Cranch, 33; 1 Cond. Rep. 346.
It is undoubtedly a well-established principle in the exposition of statutes, that every part is to be considered, and the intention of the legislature to be extracted from the whole. It is also true that

[p584-1] Under the act of Congress passed July 14, 1832, ch. 227, entitled “An act to alter and amend the several acts imposing duties on imports,” worsted shawls with cotton borders, and worsted suspenders with cotton straps or ends, are not subjected to a duty of fifty per cent. ad valorem. Elliott v. Swartwout, 10 Peters, 137.
Laws imposing duties on goods are intended for practical use and application by men engaged in commerce, and hence it has become a settled rule in the interpretation of statutes of this description to construe the language adopted by the legislature, and particularly in the denomination of articles, according to the commercial understanding of the terms used. Ibid.
Construction of statutes:
The principles applied in the courts of the United States, in relation to the construction of statutes of the United States, and of statutes in general.
The suspension of a statute for a limited time, is not a repeal of it. Brown, plaintiff in error, v. Barry, 3 Dall. 365; 1 Cond. Rep. 165.
The intention of the legislature, when discovered, must prevail; any rule of construction, declared by previous acts, to the contrary notwithstanding. Ibid.
The presumption must always be in favour of the validity of a law if the contrary is not clearly demonstrated. Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 14; 1 Cond. Rep. 211.
A legislative act founded on a mistaken opinion of what was law, does not change the actual state of the law, as to pre-existing cases. Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch 1; 1 Cond. Rep. 239.
It is true, that in mere private cases between individuals, a court will and ought to struggle hard against a construction, which will, by a retrospective operation, affect the rights of parties; but in great national concerns, where individual rights acquired by war are sacrificed for national purposes, the contract making the sacrifice ought always to receive a construction conforming to its manifest import; and if the nation has given up the vested rights of its citizens, it is not for the court, but for the government, to consider whether it be a case proper for compensation. United States v. The Schooner Peggy. 1 Cranch, 103; 1 Cond. Rep. 256.
If the courts are to regard the constitution, and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; 1 Cond. Rep. 267.
In the construction of a statute, positive and explicit provisions, comprehending in terms a whole class of cases, are not to be restrained by applying to those cases an implication drawn from subsequent words; unless that implication be very clear, necessary, and irresistible. Faw v. Marsteller, 2 Cranch, 10; 1 Cond. Rep. 337.
Where a case is shown to be out of the mischief intended to be guarded against, or out of the spirit of the law; the letter of the statute will not be deemed so unequivocal as absolutely to exclude another construction. Ibid.
It is said the case ought to be an extraordinary one, that the circumstances ought to be uncommon, which would warrant a departure from the general principles established for the government of contracts. This is true, and the Supreme Court would certainly not feel itself at liberty to exercise, on a common occasion, a discretionary power, limited only by the opinion entertained of the naked justice of the case. Ibid.
That a law is the best expositor of itself; that every part of an act is to be taken into view for the purpose of discovering the mind of the legislature; and that the details of one part may contain regulations restricting the extent of general expressions used in another part of the same act; are among those plain rules laid down by common sense for the exposition of statutes, which have been uniformly acknowledged. Pennington v. Coxe, 2 Cranch, 33; 1 Cond. Rep. 346.
It is undoubtedly a well-established principle in the exposition of statutes, that every part is to be considered, and the intention of the legislature to be extracted from the whole. It is also true that

[1]

Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 4.djvu/630

Navigation menu

Search