Statute ⅠⅠ.
Chap. CLXXXIX.—An Act making an appropriation to supply a deficiency in the navy pension fund.[1]
- ↑ Act relating to the navy pension fund, July 10, 1832, chap. 194.
Where the plaintiff has stated an account on a principle unfavorable to himself, as to the charge of interest, he ought to be bound by it. Ibid.
There is no difference as to the application of the general rule relative to calculating interest on debts legally carrying interest, and on those debts where interest is given in the name of damages. Ibid.
The rate of interest fixed by the law of Georgia, the contract having been made there, will be allowed in the courts on such contracts, although it may exceed the interest allowed by law of the State in which the court sits. Jaffray v. Dennis, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 253.
The defendant settled his account at the treasury department in 1808, on which a balance was stated against him. In 1812 he claimed further credits, which were allowed to him, and which reduced the balance claimed in 1808. The courts instructed the jury to allow interest on the actual balance from 1808. United States v. Ormsby, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 195.
Where there have been running accounts between parties, and one party has been in the habit of transmitting his accounts regularly to the other, striking a balance, and charging or giving credit for interest, as the balance might be, and no objections have been made to it, and where this mode of stating accounts is shown to the custom of trade, such manner of charging interest is legal. Barclay v. Kennedy et al. 3 Wash. C. C. R. 350.
A usage to add interest to the annual account at the end of the year, and interest on the balance, does not apply in a case in which the commercial intercourse between the countries in which the parties respectively reside, had ceased when the account was transmitted; nor will it authorize the creditor to make other rests in the account. Denniston et al. v. Imbrie, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 396.
Where an alien enemy has an agent in the United States, and this is known to the debtor, interest ought not to abate during a war. Ibid.
A promise was made by the defendant, the drawer of a protested bill of exchange, that if the plaintiff would give time, he would pay the bill when he should be able. In an action on the new promise, the plaintiff is entitled only to the sum stated in the bill, and to interest from the time when defendant was able; and not to any damages. If the jury give more, the court will set aside the verdict, unless the plaintiff enter a remittitur for the overplus. Lonsdale v. Brown, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 148.
If there has not been a previous demand of the penalty of a bond, or an acknowledgment that the whole is due, interest is recoverable only from the commencement of the suit, on a bond with sureties given to the Bank of the United States for the faithful discharge of the duties of cashier of the branch bank at Middletown, Connecticut. United States Bank v. Magill et al., Paine’s C. C. R. 661.
Interest is not allowed on unliquidated damages. Gilpins v. Consequa, Peters’ C. C. R. 86.
It is generally in the discretion of the jury to give interest in the name of damages. Willings et al. v. Consequa, Peters’ C. C. R. 172.
Damages for breach of contract do not bear interest. Youqua v. Nixon, Peters’ C. C. R. 224.
When an attachment is laid on money in the hands of a third person, interest ceases from the time of the attachment until it is dissolved; but where a debtor who is also a creditor lays an attachment in his own hands, interest is chargeable during the continuance of the attachment. Ibid. 303.
It is the usage at Canton to add interest to the other charges on the amount of the articles sold, and for which compensation is demanded. This will be allowed in the United States, on a Canton contract. Ibid.
Interest on debts due by citizens of the United States to the subjects of the king of Great Britain, ceased during the revolutionary war, and during the war of 1812; but the mere circumstance of war existing between two countries is not a sufficient reason for abating interest on the debts due by the subjects of one belligerent to the subjects of another. Conn et al. v. Penn et al. Peters’ C. C. R. 497.
A prohibition of all intercourse with an enemy during a war, furnishes a just reason for the abatement of interest on debts due to the subjects of the belligerent; until the return of peace. Ibid.
The rule as to the abatement of interest during the war, does not apply where the creditor, although a subject of the enemy, remains in the country of the debtor, or has a known agent residing there, and who is authorized to receive the debt. Ibid.
An account current, received and not objected to in a reasonable time, becomes a settled account bearing interest from the time it is stated, and the balance is payable on demand. Bainbridge & Co. v. Wilcocks, Baldwin’s C. C. R. 538.
An account made up of principal and interest becomes one principal debt; the aggregate balance, where the account is thus settled, bearing interest. Ibid. 540.
Compound interest is not illegal, and may be recovered on an express promise, or one implied by law, as a part of the contract. Ibid. 541.
If an account contains a charge of interest during a war, it is recoverable if there is a promise to pay the amount after peace, or the account is in fact or law a settled account, from which a promise results by operation of law. Ibid. 542.
Whether the jury, in case in which a man covenants to convey lands without fraud, and it afterwards appeared that, in truth, he had no title to the land, when he covenanted to convey, should allow interest on the value of the lands at the date of the contract, must depend on the circumstances of the case, of which they are the proper judges; and it is competent to the defendant to give in evidence any circumstances tending to show interest should not be allowed. Letcher & Arnold v. Woodson, 1 Brockenb. C. C. R. 212.
The interest allowed on the personal estate, for the sums advanced by it to discharge the specialty debts, should, in accordance both with the general course of the court, and with justice in particular cases, be limited to twenty years. Byrd v. Executors of Byrd, 2 Brockenb. C. C. R. 171.
Where a mortgagee is in possession, and the annual rents and profits of the mortgaged estate, exceed
