light most favorable to the prevailing party. United States v. Ganzer, 922 F.3d 579, 583 (5th Cir. 2019). In reviewing a district court’s denial of a suppression motion for evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant, our precedent usually applies a two-step test. United States v. Allen, 625 F.3d 830, 835 (5th Cir. 2010). First, we decide whether the good faith exception should apply. Id. If the good faith exception applies, then no further inquiry is required. Id. If the good faith exception does not apply, we proceed to a second step of analysis, in which we review whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed. Id.
The good faith exception to the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment arises when an officer’s reliance on a defective search warrant is “objectively reasonable.” United States v. Sibley, 448 F.3d 754, 757 (5th Cir. 2006). In such a case, the evidence obtained from the search “will not be excluded.” Id. This court has decided that the good faith exception applies to most searches undertaken pursuant to a warrant unless one of the four situations enumerated in Leon removes the warrant from the exception’s protection. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923; see Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978). Only one of these “exceptions to the good faith exception” is relevant here: Morton alleges that the warrant “so lack[ed] indicia of probable cause” that the officers’ reliance on it was “entirely unreasonable.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
To determine if there were indicia of probable cause, the reviewing court will usually be required to look at the affidavit supporting the warrant, but, even so, all of the circumstances surrounding the warrant’s issuance may be considered. United States v. Payne, 341 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Fisher, 22 F.3d 574, 578 (5th Cir. 1994). Affidavits must raise a “fair probability” or a “substantial chance” that criminal evidence will be
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