reasons: (1) as a matter of law, Google has no duty to deal with Microsoft and (2) Plaintiff States did not produce evidence of anticompetitive effects.
Finally, in Sections VIII.A and VIII.B, respectively, the court discusses the intent evidence in this case and Plaintiffs’ request for sanctions under Rule 37.
II. MONOPOLY POWER: GENERAL SEARCH SERVICES
The Supreme Court has defined “monopoly power” to mean “the power to control prices or exclude competition.” United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). “More precisely, a firm is a monopolist if it can profitably raise prices substantially above the competitive level.” Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 51. Direct evidence of such pricing power is “rarely available[.]” Id. So, “courts more typically examine market structure in search of circumstantial evidence of monopoly power.” Id. Applying this “structural approach,” a court may infer monopoly power “from a firm’s possession of a dominant share of a relevant market that is protected by entry barriers.” Id. Entry barriers are factors “that prevent new rivals from timely responding to an increase in price above the competitive level.” Id.
Plaintiffs maintain that Google has monopoly power in the product market for general search services in the United States. According to Plaintiffs, Google has a dominant and durable share in that market, and that share is protected by high barriers to entry. Google counters that there is no such thing as a product market for general search services. What exists instead, Google insists, is a broader market for query responses, in which there is vigorous competition. Google’s Post-Trial Br., ECF No. 908 [hereinafter GTB], at 8–15. That market includes a host of other firms that fall outside of Plaintiffs’ proposed market, including (1) SVPs like Amazon, Booking.com, and Yelp, (2) social media companies like Meta (which owns Facebook and Instagram) and TikTok, and (3) prominent stand-alone websites, like
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