Post marketing strategy paper discussing radio ads. See id. at 583. The court explained that this evidence, “if anything, . . . tends to show that all of these media outlets are within the same product market, to the extent that they are competing for the same limited pool of advertisers’ dollars.” Id. Beryln is of limited utility here. There can be no genuine comparison between the paucity of record evidence in Beryln versus the mountain of evidence presented in this case. Moreover, this court considered the evidence here in light of the Brown Shoe factors, which is something the Berlyn court did not need to do on a limited evidentiary record.
Google’s other authorities are likewise inapposite. Google cites Hicks v. PGA Tour, Inc. for the proposition that “many courts have rejected antitrust claims reliant on proposed advertising markets limited to a single form of advertising.” GTB at 15–16 (quoting 897 F.3d 1109, 1123 (9th Cir. 2018)). But “Hicks does not apply where,” as here, “a plaintiff has alleged that two types of advertising have fundamentally different purposes.” Klein, 580 F. Supp. 3d at 784. Google also cites to decades-old cases decided at the motion-to-dismiss stage, which rejected Sherman Act claims for failure to adequately allege digital ads markets. See Kinderstart.com LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 06-cv-2057 (JFRS), 2007 WL 831806, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007); Am. Online, Inc. v. GreatDeals.Net, 49 F. Supp. 2d 851, 858 (E.D. Va. 1999); GCL ¶¶ 19, 26. These cases are inapposite for numerous reasons, including that they predate the digital advertising boom and were decided on the pleadings. See GFOF ¶¶ 990–991 (“Digital Advertising is dynamic and growing. . . . Indeed, digital advertising has undergone dramatic change even in just the last few years.”). More recent decisions, however, with the benefit of a factual record, have refused to lump together various forms of digital advertising merely because advertisers spend in different channels. See, e.g., IQVIA, 2024 WL 81232, at *17. ***
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