discussed, Google in fact has profitably raised prices substantially above the competitive level. That makes “the existence of monopoly power [] clear.” Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 51.
***
The court thus concludes that Google has monopolized the market for general search text advertising.
- C. The Evidence Does Not Support a Market for General Search Advertising.
Finally, the court addresses Plaintiff States’ market for general search advertising. General search advertising is alleged to be a submarket of search advertising that “includes all ads that appear on a GSE results page in response to a user query, which overwhelmingly consists of text ads and product listing ads” but also encompasses local ads and travel ads. Pl. States’ Post-Trial Brief, ECF No. 900 [hereinafter PSTB], at 8. While the court has found that the record establishes both a broader market (search advertising) and a narrower submarket (general search text ads), the Brown Shoe factors do not warrant recognition of a general search ads market.
Peculiar Characteristics and Uses. Plaintiff States’ core argument is that all the differences between GSEs and SVPs already described, supra Section II.B, support a market solely comprised of search ads that appear on GSE SERPs. Specifically, they claim that “[g]eneral search advertising is a relevant market because all ads on a GSE’s results page reach users who are considering the broad range of choices and destinations provided by a GSE.” PSTB at 8. Because of a GSE’s breadth compared to an SVP, Plaintiff States contend that “GSE users are more likely to be in a research or consideration mindset, whereas SVP users are more likely to be in a purchase mindset.” Id. at 9. Users can purchase a product directly on an SVP’s platform, whereas they cannot do so with Google. FOF ¶¶ 144–145, 194. This makes GSEs “attractive to advertisers
191
