improving the state of browsers would overall help users use the web more, will increase online activity and increase search usage, including Google’s usage.”). Google supports its position with the testimony of its expert, Dr. Murphy. See Tr. at 9855:11-23 (Murphy). He opined, “[I]f I generate more of a complementary good[], right, I give you a better browser, you’re going to do more search, right, that’s how I can compete for more search, and just like lower prices expand output, these lower price[s] expand output too, and they’re going to expand output not just of search but also out of these complementary products.” Id. at 9705:19-24 (Murphy). The court accepts that the user experience of a browser is enhanced when the default GSE is excellent, but the evidence shows no more.
The ISA does not require Apple to use revenue share payments to improve Safari, and Google has presented no evidence that Apple does so. Mozilla likely does use its payments from Google to upgrade Firefox (given that those payments make up 80% of its operating budget), but Firefox’s contribution to the overall search market is so small that the additional output it produces, at most, marginal procompetitive benefits. FOF ¶ 11. Importantly, even if there is a link between more competitive browsers and search output, Google not shown how the exclusivity of its agreements has produced that benefit. Dr. Murphy did not, for example, opine that the exclusivity feature of the distribution agreements was a contributor to increased search output. Moreover, Dr. Murphy conceded that there are multiple reasons why output in search has continued to expand for reasons that have nothing to do with Google as the exclusive default GSE. Tr. at 9710:4-25, 9711:5–9712:22, 10186:6-13 (Murphy).
Second, Google claims that the Android agreements promote smartphone competition between Android and Apple devices (inter-brand competition) and among Android devices (intra-brand competition). “This smartphone competition leads to higher-quality, lower-priced devices,
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