550, 109 USPQ 200 (7th Cir. 1956). In a case such as this, where copying is admitted, the introduction of a certificate of registration by the plaintiff will support a judgment in favor of the plaintiff unless the defendant presents evidence that the claim of copyright is invalid. In other words, the burden of going forward is on the defendant.
Nimmer states that the better view, under the former act, was that the certificate only constitutes prima facie evidence of the specific facts stated in the certificate, and not of the overall validity of the copyright which depends on a number of factors, such as originality and publication with notice, which are not specifically stated in the certificate. Nimmer on Copyright, Section 12.11(B) (1979). However, as Nimmer recognizes, the prevailing view, by a wide margin, was that the certificate was also prima facie evidence of validity. See Flick-Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-Line Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 546, 146 USPQ 694 (7th Cir. 1965) and Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279, 164 USPQ 481 (5th Cir. 1970) plus numerous District Court cases cited in Nimmer, supra, footnote 21.
It is interesting to note that the new statute, 17 U.S.C.A. Section 410(c), provides expressly that the certificate will constitute prima facie evidence of validity, in line with the prevailing view. In the historical note to this section the House Committee on the Judiciary, House Report 94-1476, says this about the problem:
The principle that a certificate represents prima facie evidence of copyright validity has been established in a long line of court decisions, and it is a sound one. It is true that, unlike a patent claim, a claim to copyright is not examined for basic validity before a certificate is issued. On the other hand, endowing a copyright claimant who has obtained a certificate with a rebuttable presumption of the validity of the copyright does not deprive the defendant in an infringement suit of any rights; it merely orders the burdens of proof. The plaintiff should not ordinarily be forced in the first instance to prove all of the multitude of facts that underline the validity of the copyright unless the defendant, by effectively challenging them, shifts the burden of doing so to the plaintiff.
The Court takes this to mean that only those specific facts which are effectively challenged by the defendant need be proven by the plaintiff possessing a certificate of registration. All other facts upon which the validity of a copyright depends retain their prima facie value. Thus, if the defendant only presents evidence challenging originality, the burden of proof shifts only as to originality.
The problem in this case is slightly different in that it involves the effect of a deliberate misstatement in the certificate and the effect this has on the prima facie value of the certificate as a whole. The defendant argues that by showing that the plaintiff is not the author of the Urantia Book as stated in the Certificate of Registration, something which the plaintiff concedes, he has destroyed the prima facie value of the Certificate and has placed the burden of proving the validity of its claim on the plaintiff. However, similar considerations to those discussed above argue against the view espoused by the defendant.
The rule has been stated that the introduction of evidence showing the inaccuracy of some fact or facts stated in the certificate places the burden on the plaintiff to overcome this evidence. Gardenia Flowers Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 280 F.Supp. 776, 157 USPQ 685 (D.C.N.Y. 1968); Van Cleef & Arpels Inc. v. Schecter, 308 F.Supp. 674, 164 USPQ 540 (D.C.N.Y. 1969). However, it is also true that courts generally seek to preserve copyrights rather than invalidate them on the basis of minor defects in the registration certificates. Huk-A-Poo Sportswear Inc. v. Little Lisa Ltd., 74 F.R.D. 621, 195 USPQ 763 (D.C.N.Y. 1977); United States v. Backer, 134 F.2d 533, 57 USPQ 133 (2d Cir. 1943). A misstatement in a Certificate of Registration, unless accompanied by fraud, will not invalidate the copyright or render the certificate incapable of supporting an action for infringement. Baldwin Cooke Co. v. Keith Clark Inc., 383 F.Supp. 650, 183 USPQ 209 (N.D. Ill. 1974). This is particularly true when the mistake in the certificate did not affect the decision of the copyright office in issuing the certificate. Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Irving J. Dorfman Co., 433 F.2d 409, 167 USPQ 417 (2d Cir. 1970) cert. denied 401 U.S. 977, 169 USPQ 65 (1971). Under 17 U.S.C. former section 209 the identity of the author of a work does not have to be disclosed in registering a copyright. It follows that a misstatement as to authorship, unless made for some fraudulent purpose will not invalidate an otherwise valid copyright. (see Thomas Wilson, supra). That is, the copyright remains valid as long as the claimant has a legitimate claim of copyright, regardless of who is the actual author.
It is obvious that such a rule is consistent with the majority view regarding the prima facie value of the certificate outlined above,
