tionship. To find that the plaintiff is the author of The URANTIA Book pursuant to the “works for hire” doctrine on the basis of the evidence relied upon by the Urantia Foundation “would be to substitute mere speculation for reason and experience.” Epoch, 522 F.2d at 744.
2. Composite Works
The plaintiff earnestly argues that The URANTIA Book is a composite work. This is the plaintiff’s attempt to validate its copyright renewal, not by claiming that it is the author of the book based upon the “works for hire” doctrine but by claiming it is the proprietor of a composite work who originally secured the copyright in the work. As previously mentioned, Section 24 of the 1909 Act entitles such a proprietor “to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work.” 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976).
I agree that The URANTIA Book may be considered a composite work, if the term is simply defined as a work “to which a number of authors have contributed distinguishable parts, which they have not however ‘separately registered.’ ” Shapiro, 123 F.2d at 699. The book, itself, suggests that it was written by “a number of authors.” The “Urantia Papers” are obviously “distinguishable parts” and the Copyright Office verifies that no other author of the book has “separately registered.” Such concessions, however, do not benefit the plaintiff.
The legislative history shows that the determinative factors in a ‘composite work’ were:
1) A number of authors contributing copyrightable matter to a single work; and
2) An employment or contractual arrangement entitling the proprietor to secure copyright in the various contributions.
Cadence Industries Corp. v. Ringer, 450 F.Supp. 59, 64 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (quoting Ringer, Renewal of Copyright (1960)).
As already discussed in depth, the evidence is insufficient to substantiate the claim that the plaintiff became the author of The URANTIA Book through an employment arrangement. The plaintiff is therefore relegated to arguing that it is the proprietor. However, “ ‘[p]roprietor’ is the equivalent of ‘assign’; a ‘proprietor’ must trace title from the author.” Quinn-Brown Publishing Corp. v. Chilton Co., 15 F.Supp. 213, 214 (S.D.N.Y.1936) (citing Mifflin v. R.H. White Co., 190 U.S. 260, 23 S.Ct. 769, 47 L.Ed. 1049 (1903); Public Ledger v. New York Times, 275 F. 562 (S.D.N.Y.1921), aff’d, 279 F. 747 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 627, 42 S.Ct. 383, 66 L.Ed. 798 (1922)). “And, in pleading a case of infringement, the plaintiff must show title, not merely by broad allegation of proprietorship, but by setting forth facts which indicate how he became proprietor.” Quinn-Brown, 15 F.Supp. at 214 (citations omitted). The plaintiff channels its efforts toward proving that the structure of The URANTIA Book satisfies the definition of a composite work, but is unable to offer evidence that the individual “Urantia Papers” were transferred pursuant to a contractual arrangement, entitling the plaintiff to become their proprietor. Ultimately, I find insufficient evidence to suggest that the plaintiff acquired the “Urantia Papers” in any way other than serendipitously.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment, filing 199, is granted as to (1) Count I of plaintiff’s complaint for copyright infringement; and (2) Count I of defendant’s counterclaim declaring the copyright renewal in The URANTIA Book to be invalid.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,
v.
David CRUMBY, Defendant.
No. CR 94-122-PHX-RGS.
United States District Court,
D. Arizona.
July 7, 1995.
