Cite as 895 F.Supp. 1329 (D.Ariz. 1995)
circles mark and the name Urantia.” Id. at ¶14. Therefore, assuming, as I must, that the plaintiff’s copyright and trademarks are valid, I find that the Free Exercise Clause is not a proper defense to the defendant’s actions.
b. The Establishment Clause
The First Amendment commands that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. Const. amend. I. The defendant does not contend that either the copyright or the trademark laws, as written, run afoul of this amendment. Therefore, if the defendant is unable to refute the plaintiffs presumptions of validity concerning the copyright and trademarks at issue, I am satisfied that this court may enforce the aforementioned laws without violating the Constitution. If the plaintiff is found to have a valid copyright or trademark, the enforcement of such cannot be said to be fostering the “establishment” of the Urantia Foundation as a religion. The recognition of copyright or trademark protection for the Urantia Foundation in common with all other entities that comply with statutory formalities “reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences, and does not represent that involvement of religious with secular institutions which it is the object of the Establishment Clause to forestall.” Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1797, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963); see Bridge Pub, Inc. v. Vien, 827 F.Supp. 629 (S.D.Cal.1993) (holding the enforcement of valid copyrights violates neither the establishment clause nor the free exercise clause); United Christian Scientists v. First Church of Christ, 829 F.2d 1152, 1159 (D.C.Cir.1987) (“Normally, a grant of copyright on a religious work poses no constitutional difficulty.”); Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979 (4th Cir.1944) (holding freedom of religion no defense to the misleading and injurious use of trade name).
2. Freedom of Speech
a. The General Rule
The defendant claims that enforcing the plaintiff’s copyright and trademarks would violate her right to freedom of speech. (Def’s Br. at 2.) The plaintiff, however, is not attempting to prevent the defendant from “spreading the gospel of The URANTIA Book.” Id. at 5. Nor does the plaintiff seek to prohibit the defendant from uttering the word “Urantia,” or enjoin the defendant from ever displaying the three blue concentric circles. The plaintiff merely requests that the court protect its property interests in what are presumed to be a valid copyright and trademarks.
The defendant does not dispute that copyrights and trademarks and the right to their exclusive use are property. Therefore, assuming, as I must, the validity of the plaintiff’s copyright and trademarks, “[i]t would be an unwarranted infringement of property rights to require them to yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of communication exist. Such an accommodation would diminish property rights without significantly enhancing the asserted right of free speech.” Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567, 92 S.Ct. 2219, 2228, 33 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972). The alternative avenues of communication available to the defendant are numerous. There are, however, two avenues that must not be ventured down. The defendant may not copy and distribute the text of The URANTIA Book, if the copyright is valid, and the defendant may not use the plaintiff’s trademarks in a manner that is confusing to the public and injurious to the Urantia Foundation, if the trademarks are valid. “The first amendment is not a license to trammel on legally recognized rights in intellectual property.” Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir.1979).
b. The Zapruder Exception
The defendant has gone to great length to convince the court that the instant case calls for the application of a pure First Amendment defense, similar to that which has been hypothesized by Professor Nimmer. See (Def’s Br. at 11–13.); 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 1.10[C][2] (1994) [hereinafter Nimmer]. The defendant offers a list of cases in which other courts although “not faced with
