promoted by Cortés himself in furtherance of his plans. He at any rate seized the pretence to hold a council, composed of Alvarado, Leon, Ordaz, and Sandoval, together with twelve soldiers whose advice he most valued, "including myself," says Bernal Diaz. His chief reason was to persuade them of the necessity for the measure he had resolved on, and to win their hearty coöperation. Laying before them the current rumors which confirmed the warnings fornerly received, and representing the unreliable and suspicious character of Montezuma, his great power, and the peculiar position and strength of the city, he concluded by proposing the daring venture of seizing the emperor and holding him a hostage.[1]
Here was folly run mad! Four hundred men, after penetrating formidable barriers and gaining the very heart of a great empire, whose vast armies could oppose a thousand warriors to every Spaniard there, coolly propose to take captive the worshipped monarch of this vast realm, and then to defy its millions of subjects! The wildest tales of mediæval knights hardly equal this project. Reckless as was the conception, it was the fruit of yet greater audacity. Cortés reared his structure of folly insensate upon the platform of still greater insensate folly. If it was true that he had practically placed himself in the position of a captive, then he would cut the knot by capturing the captor. And yet, foolhardy as might appear the scheme when coolly viewed from the isle of Cuba, situated as the Spaniards were, it was doubtless the best they could do; it was doubtless all they could do. The efficiency of hostages had been fre-
- ↑ According to Bernal Diaz the members of this council suggested not only the seizure but the reasons for it. Cortés responded that he had not been oblivious of the danger, but saw not how the seizure could be effected. The captains proposed to beguile the prince to their quarter and detain him. If Cortés hesitated they were willing to undertake the task. The old soldier is evidently misled, as he was in the scuttling affair, to assume too much credit for himself and his fellow-soldiers. Cortés had no doubt adopted his common tactics, so frequently admitted by Bernal Diaz himself, of inspiring his comrades to suggest what he had resolved on. This is proved by the promise made to the emperor in his first letter, four months before, to capture Montezuma.
