Such was the reception which the news of the capture of Monterey met with in the United States. As a material result bearing upon the ultimate object of the war, the possession of the city at the cost of so much bloodshed was of no advantage. It was an experimental movement, which merely proved the bravery and endurance of American troops, and the impracticability of carrying on the war with any effect, through sterile regions, in the direction of the Mexican capital.[1] In fact, the campaign on the Rio Grande had proved by no means consequential.
- ↑ I do not intend,' says Taylor, writing to Gaines from Monterey, Nov. 5th, 'to rarry on my operations (as previously stated) beyond Saltillo — deeming it next to impracticable to do so.' Niles' Reg., lxxi. 342.
reply, shows that he adopted the convention from cogent reasons, namely: that with his force he could not so invest Monterey as to preclude the escape of the Mexican army; that the considerations of humanity outweighed the doubtful advantages to be gained by a resumption of the attack. With regard to the armistice, it paralyzed the enemy during a period when, from the want of necessary means, he could not possibly move. Id., pp 359-60. In his letter to Gaines he writes: 'Besides, they had a very large and strong fortification' — the citadel — a short distance from the city which, if carried with the bayonet, must have been taken at a great sacrifice of life, and, with our limited train of heavy or battering artillery, it would have required twenty or twenty-five days to take it by regular approaches.' Niles' Reg., lxxi. 342. Jefferson Davis, writing from Victoria, Tamaulipas, Jan. 6, 1847, says: I did not then, nor do I now, believe we could have made the enemy surrender at discretion;. . .we could drive the enemy from the town; but the town was untenable while the main fort (called the new citadel) remained in the hands of the enemy.' Reid's Tex. Rangers, 205.
