all-influential Marquez. His reasons are not given. In case of defeat, Querétaro would still have served as a refuge.[1] And so the precious moments were allowed to glide by, the imperialists passively waiting till the Juarist forces had come up and invested the place with lines and batteries, shutting them up in their mouse-trap, as the emperor not inaptly began to term it. Now, when the dispiriting effect of a siege began to be felt, Marquez recommended that they should evacuate the city, beat a retreat to Mexico, and there with all available forces deliver battle to the united republican armies and settle the question at one cast. This advice was not acted upon, partly owing to the demoralizing influence of a retreat and the danger of assault from the growing masses of pursuers, who already numbered 25,000 before Querétaro alone, including nearly a third of cavalry, not to mention the large forces which Diaz and other leaders could bring against the rear.[2]
On March 5th the republican forces appeared before Querétaro, and began to occupy positions, at first along the south and west line, extending later east and north, as additional troops arrived, and protected by the batteries established on the surrounding hills. They embraced the army of the north under Treviño,
- ↑ Hans, Basch, Salm-Salm, and others, all combine in blaming Marquez for this neglect. The quarrel then rising between him and Miramon is supposed by some to have contributed to it; yet the latter in subsequent council openly charges Marquez with the sole responsibility, and no satisfactory excuse was tendered. Arellano, 41-3; Basch, ii. 56. A letter signed somewhat later by the leading generals confirm Miramon's charge, and this Arias, Reseña, 215, also publishes.
- ↑ Marquez, who claims this as a brilliant plan, expected to have 17,000 to 20,000 men on reaching Mexico. He assumes that Mejía and Arellano alone opposed it, the latter secretly. Mejía urged that in case of a retreat, artillery and cumbrous baggage should be abandoned, and a mountain route taken. Vidaurri believed that Monterey would offer better advantages than Mexico for obtaining men and means. Refut., 55-8. Maximilian preferred to gather confidence and try the foe by a series of sorties. Arellano, Ultimas Horas, 49. Marquez this time objected in vain, says Hans, Quer., 68. Vidaurri's proposal for a campaign in the north had found utterance already on the way to Querétaro, in a proclamation by Maximilian to his army, wherein he also alluded to the inspiring sense of being freed from foreign pressure, and of being able to lift high their banner, Arrangoiz, Méj., iv. 250-reflections by no means pleasing to the French.
