gramme of the original plan had not given satisfaction to many of the prominent leaders of the revolution, who regarded it with suspicion. It was too narrow in its conception. While proclaiming the supremacy of the constitution, the free suffrage of the people, and non-reelection, it left these organic principles exposed to military oppression. It denounced the administration of Lerdo as an exhibition of usurpation and assumption of dictatorial powers, ruinous alike to the libertv and interests of the nation. But while seeking to overthrow one despotic government by a national exertion, it paved the way for the establishment of another of similar character. Had it not been for the unpopularity of Lerdo, the revolution, under such a programme, would have perished in its infancy. But the main and determined intention of the discontented was to get rid of Lerdo, and they did not wait to examine too closely and demur against the plan under which they commenced action. It could be rectified when the leading object was attained.
By the plan of Tuxtepec, Lerdo was no longer recognized as the executive power, nor any of his ministers or officials in their positions. Only such governors of states as accepted the plan would be recognized, and substitutes would be appointed by the general-inchief of the revolutionary forces. The governors thus established were to appoint a provisional executive; and as Diaz was declared the general-in-chief by the tenth article, and could appoint the substitute governors, it was obvious that he would become the president ad interim, with the means at his command of supporting his intentions by military force if he chose. Diaz soon perceived the objections to which this plan was exposed, and the dislike with which it was regarded. The leaders in the northern provinces suggested that Iglesias, the president of the supreme court — and by virtue of that position the vice-president of the republic — should be called upon to assume the executive power, and in the reformed plan this
