Thomas, J., dissenting
no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits,” and it remanded for the lower courts to determine whether the suit was so barred. Id., at 292–293. This statement that the time bar went to “jurisdiction” was an integral part of the Court’s instructions on remand. Moreover, on remand, the Eighth Circuit understood the Court to have used the term “jurisdiction” to refer to a court’s authority to hear the case. See North Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ. and School Lands v. Block, 789 F. 2d 1308, 1310 (CA8 1986) (noting that neither the Eighth Circuit nor the District Court had “ ‘jurisdiction to inquire into the merits’ ” because the Act’s “statute of limitations is jurisdictional”).
In Mottaz, three years after Block, the Court again considered the jurisdictional nature of the Act’s time bar. In the lower courts, the Government initially defended against a “somewhat opaque” set of claims by relying on the general 6-year statute of limitations for actions against the United States, 28 U. S. C. §2401(a). Mottaz, 476 U. S., at 839. The District Court held that the suit was time barred under §2401(a), but the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. Id., at 838–839. The Government then argued, for the first time, in its petition for rehearing in the Court of Appeals that the suit arose under the Quiet Title Act and was thus subject to the Act’s 12-year statute of limitations. Id., at 840–841. This Court granted certiorari “to consider whether [the] respondent’s claim was barred under either [the 6-year bar] or [the 12-year bar].” Id., at 841.
In addressing these, the Court cited Sherwood for the proposition that, “[w]hen the United States consents to be sued, the terms of its waiver of sovereign immunity define the extent of the court’s jurisdiction.” 476 U. S., at 841. It then quoted Block for the proposition that “ ‘[w]hen waiver legislation contains a statute of limitations, the limitations provision constitutes a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity,’ ” treating Block as precedential on this point. 476 U. S., at 841. The Court also characterized the statute
