STRIKE STRATEGY
paid little attention to it. But this campaign was carried out on new lines, the effect of which he completely underestimated.
The original plan of the campaign was to make a swift organizing drive simultaneously in all steel centers. The situation was such that, with just a few weeks of work as proposed, such a grip could have been secured on the mass of steel workers that Gary, taken by surprise, would have been unable, when he did realize the effectiveness of the new tactics, to take any counter measure sufficient to defeat the campaign.
But the trade union leaders, partly through ignorance and partly because they were opposed to organizing the steel workers anyway, refused to support such a swift, national offensive against the Steel Trust, which they had every means in hand to carry out. They confined the opening of the campaign to the Chicago district. There it proved highly successful. In two weeks of actual work the masses were either in the unions or under their direct influence. The same thing that was done in the Chicago district could have easily been done all over the country, had it not been for the reactionary leadership of the unions. Gary quickly woke up after he saw what had happened in the Chicago district. His company gave the workers the basic 8-hour day and checked the movement. Thus we lost the advantage of surprise in this case where it would have been decisively favorable for the workers. The real working class strike strategist will always keep this question of surprise in his mind when working out his policies.
4—Dramatizing the Struggle.
An essential of good strike strategy under present day conditions in the United States is to lend a dramatic character to strike and organization campaigns, especially those among unorganized workers. These see in a dramatic strike
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