ance, when put to the test, collapsed like federations always do under pressure. The trouble started in the Spring of 1921, when the miners were bitterly attacked by the mine owners. They called upon the two affiliated groups of railroads and transport workers to help them. This the latter made a show of doing, going so far even as to call a general strike in support of the miners. But this never materialized. On the contrary, the three great unions, simply because they were separate organizations and manned by timid officials, quarrelled among themselves over the usual technicalities, personalities, etc. and finally declared off the threatened strike. The miners were left to make the fight alone, and the general result was far worse than if there had been no Triple Alliance at all. The affair was a terrific defeat for the whole working class.
Above all the labor movement is a fighting organization, and a successful fighting machine can never be constructed on the basis of federation. This was clearly demonstrated during the World War in the military forces of the Allies. In the beginning the Allied armies were practically federated. But naturally no real concerted action was possible among them, just as it is impossible among federated trade unions and for the same reasons. No general strategy could be developed. When France was making a drive against the Central Powers, England, Italy, Russia and the rest would invariably be doing the reverse of what they should be, and vice versa. Nor could the most pressing danger of defeat put an end to this condition and make the federated armies function effectively. When they had nearly lost the war then the Allies applied the remedy, amalgamation. The several armies were placed under one head. This doubled their power and sounded the death knell of the opposing military forces. Whether in social or military warfare, unity of thought and action can come only through unity of organization. That is the great lesson railroad men have yet to learn.
