we undo the certification. A district court “must first have the opportunity to pass upon [every] issue,” so we may not consider requests for relief made for the first time on appeal. S.F. Residence Club, Inc. v. 7027 Old Madison Pike, LLC, 583 F.3d 750, 755 (11th Cir. 2009).
Wood’s arguments reflect a basic misunderstanding of what mootness is. He argues that the certification does not moot anything “because this litigation is ongoing” and he remains injured. But mootness concerns the availability of relief, not the existence of a lawsuit or an injury. Fla. Wildlife Fed’n, Inc. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 647 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2011). So even if post-election litigation is not always mooted by certification, see, e.g., Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1172–73 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc), Wood’s particular requests are moot. Wood is right that certification does not moot his requests for relief concerning the 2021 runoff—although Wood’s lack of standing still forecloses our consideration of those requests—but the pendency of other claims for relief cannot rescue the otherwise moot claims. See, e.g., Adler v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1478–79, 1481 (11th Cir. 1997) (instructing the district court to dismiss moot claims but resolving other claims on the merits). Wood finally tells us that President Trump has also requested a recount, but that fact is irrelevant to whether Wood’s requests remain live.
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