will, which may easily be perverted, we here see an institution or a system of political principles which are immutable. The king is here a kind of moral person in a judicial sense, and he is less influenced by the individual passions of those who immediately surround him, than by the wants of his people; nor does he any longer act according to the unbridled desires of a court, but according to firm laws. Therefore in every country courtiers are the secret or open enemies of a constitutional system. This system has killed their power, which endured many thousands of years, by the profoundly ingenious arrangement that the king only represents the idea of power; that he may indeed choose his Ministers, but that they rule—not he; and that they in turn can only rule so long as they represent the opinions of the majority of the representatives of the people, since the latter can refuse the means of governing—that is, taxes. Therefore, as the king does not govern himself, the discontent of the people in case of bad administration cannot directly reach him. From which it results that in constitutional states the king in such cases chooses other and more popular Ministers, from whom a better government may be expected, while in absolute governments, where the king himself rules of his own free will, he is at once subjected to the wrath of his people, who, to help themselves, must overthrow the state. Therefore
