Paine Lumber Company v. Neal/Opinion of the Court

by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.

United States Supreme Court

244 U.S. 459

Paine Lumber Company  v.  Neal

 Argued: May 3 and 4, 1915. ---

This is a bill in equity brought by corporations, of states other than New York, engaged in the manufacture of doors, sash, etc., in open shops, against officers and agents of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America and of the New York branch of the same, certain union manufacturers of doors, sash, etc., members of the Manufacturing Woodworkers' Association, and many master carpenters, members of the Master Carpenters' Association, whose business is to install such products in buildings. The bill was dismissed by the district court (212 Fed. 259), and the decree was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals (130 C. C. A. 522, 214 Fed. 82).

The bill alleges a conspiracy of the members of the Brotherhood and the New York branch to prevent the exercise of the trade of carpenters by anyone not a member of the Brotherhood, and to prevent the plaintiffs and all other employers of carpenters not such members from engaging in interstate commerce and selling their goods outside of the state where the goods are manufactured, and it sets out the usual devices of labor unions as exercised to that end. In 1909 the Master Carpenters, coerced by the practical necessities of the case, made an agreement with the New York branch, accepting a previously established joint arbitration plan to avoid strikes and lockouts. This agreement provides that 'there shall be no restriction against the use of any manufactured material except nonunion or prison-made;' the arbitration plan is confined to shops that use union labor, and the employers agree to employ union labor only. The unions will not erect material made by nonunion mechanics. Another agreement between the Manufacturing Woodworkers' Association, the Brotherhood, and the New York branch, also adopts the plan of arbitration; the labor unions agree that 'none of their members will erect or install nonunion or prison-made material,' and the Woodworkers undertake that members of the Brotherhood shall 'be employed exclusively in the mills of the Manufacturing Woodworkers' Association.' It is found that most of the journeymen carpenters in Manhattan and part of Brooklyn belong to the Brotherhood, and that, owing to their refusal to work with nonunion men, and to employers finding it wise to employ union men, it is very generally impracticable to erect carpenter work in those places except by union labor. It also is found that, owing to the above provisions as to nonunion material, the sale of the plaintiffs' goods in those places has been made less. The workmen have adopted the policy complained of without malice toward the plaintiffs, as part of a plan to bring about 'a nation-wide unionization in their trade.'

An injunction is asked against the defendants (other than the Master Carpenters) conspiring to refuse to work upon material made by the plaintiff, because not made by union labor; or enforcing by-laws intended to prevent working with or upon what is called unfair material; or inducing persons to refuse to work for persons purchasing such material, or taking other enumerated steps to the same general end; or conspiring to restrain the plaintiffs' interstate business in order to compel them to refuse to employ carpenters not members of the Brotherhood. It is prayed further that the provision quoted above from the Master Carpenters' agreement and another ancillary one be declared void and the parties enjoined from carrying them out. No other or alternative relief is prayed. The ground on which the injunction was refused by the district court was that, although it appeared that the agreements above mentioned were parts of a comprehensive plan to restrain commerce among the states, the conspiracy was not directed specially against the plaintiffs and had caused them no special damage, different from that inflicted on the public at large. The circuit court of appeals, reserving its opinion as to whether any agreement or combination contrary to law was made out, agreed with the judge below on the ground that no acts directed against the plaintiffs personally were shown.

In the opinion of a majority of the court, if the facts show any violation of the Act of July 2, 1890, chap. 647, 26 Stat. at L. 209, Comp. Stat. 1916, § 8820, a private person cannot maintain a suit for an injunction under § 4 of the same (Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co. 194 U.S. 48, 70, 71, 48 L. ed. 870, 880, 881, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 598); and especially such an injunction as is sought; even if we should go behind what seems to have been the view of both courts below, that no special damage was shown, and reverse their conclusion of fact. No one would maintain that the injunction should be granted to parties not showing special injury to themselves. Personally, I lay those questions on one side because, while the Act of October 15, 1914, chap. 323, § 16, 38 Stat. at L. 730, 737, Comp. Stat. 1916, §§ 8835a, 8835o, establishes the right of private parties to an injunction in proper cases, in my opinion it also establishes a policy inconsistent with the granting of one here. I do not go into the reasoning that satisfies me, because upon this point I am in a minority.

As this court is not the final authority concerning the laws of New York, we say but a word about them. We shall not believe that the ordinary action of a labor union can be made the ground of an injunction under those laws until we are so instructed by the New York court of appeals. National Protective Asso. v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 58 L.R.A. 135, 88 Am. St. Rep. 648, 63 N. E. 369. Certainly the conduct complained of has no tendency to produce a monopoly of manufacture or building, since the more successful it is the more competitors are introduced into the trade. Cases like Kellogg v. Sowerby, 190 N. Y. 370, N. E. 47, concerning conspiracies between railroads and elevator companies to prevent competition, seem to us very clearly not to have been intended to overrule the authority that we cite, and not to have any bearing on the present point.

Decree affirmed.

Mr. Justice Pitney, with whom concurred Mr. Justice McKenna and Mr. Justice Van Devanter, dissenting:

Notes